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A true account of the actual is the rarest (oetry, for common sense
always takes a hasty and superficial view.
I. INTRODUCTION
That there is widespread discontent with the tort system is surely
an understatement. Most public discourse takes it as axiomatic that
the system is seriously flawed and needs to be reformed. The term
"tort reform" has been preempted by a set of tendentious critiques
and proposals to reduce general levels of accountability and remedy
for injury.2 The noisiest proponents of tort reform, so called, have
1. HENRY DAVID THOREAU, A WEEK ON THE CONCORD AND MERRIMACK RIVERS 325 (Carl
F. Hovde ed., Princeton Univ. Press 1980).
2. The "tort reform" addressed in this Article is the garden variety "common-sense"
version that has dominated policy debate for over a decade, which emphasizes constriction
of access, reduction of recovery, and curtailment of juries. See Joseph Sanders & Craig
Joyce, "Off to the Races": The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law Reform Process, 27 Hous. L. REV.
207 (1990); Linda Lipson, The Evolution of Products Liability as a Federal Policy Issue, in TORT
LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST: COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND CONSUMER WELFARE 247
(Peter H. Schuck ed., 1991) [hereinafter TORT LAW AND THE PUBUC INTEREST]; Glenn
Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Law Legislation: Assessing Our Control of Risks, in
TORT LAw AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra, at 272; T.R. Goldman, Tort Reform: Interests and
Agendas, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 17, 1995, at S30; Martha Middleton, A Changing Landscape,
A.B.A.J. 56 (Aug. 1995). Pondering the course of "this insular reform movement," Robert
Rabin observed that
cost pressure ... [became] the driving force, the sufficient impulse for action. As
a consequence, with no guiding conception of social welfare, the reforms of the
1980s became, in essence, victim take-away programs. The salient question be-
came how benefit levels could be reduced via ceilings on noneconomic loss, disin-
centives to sue, elimination of parties defendant, denial of collateral source
recoveries, and so forth, thereby diminishing the economic burden on a hetero-
geneous group of injury-producing activities.
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wrapped themselves in the mantle of common sense'-certainly cause
for suspicion.'
In this "common-sense" view, there are too many tort claims:
Americans sue too readily, "at the drop of a hat"; egged on by avari-
cious lawyers, they overwhelm our congested courts with mounting
numbers of suits, including many frivolous claims. Irresponsible ju-
ries, biased against deep-pocket defendants, bestow windfalls on unde-
serving plaintiffs, particularly arbitrary and capricious damages for
pain and suffering and random outsize awards of punitive damages.
Not only are the untold billions that the system costs an alarming
drain on national wealth, but the system stifles enterprise and innova-
tion, depriving society of useful products and services and undermin-
ing the international competitiveness of American business. To avoid
these effects, we need to adopt various "tort reform" proposals to in-
hibit claims (e.g., loser-pays) and limit awards (e.g., eliminating joint
and several liability, capping damages, etc.).
Outcroppings of this "common-sense" view are so numerous that
I confine myself to a few recent examples. The first is from a long-
running "public service" advertisement by the Mobil Corporation:
Americans have become a litigious lot. And no wonder. For
some, the civil justice-or the tort system-has become a
grand jackpot, providing windfalls to plaintiffs and their
lawyers.
Jury awards for punitive damages grab headlines as
they've spiralled into the millions, not to mention billions of
dollars. And thanks to the concept ofjoint and several liabil-
ity, plaintiffs' attorneys trolling the waters in the hope of
landing a big one, have cast their nets in an ever-widening
circle that promises to choke business and clog the courts.
Robert Rabin, Some Reflections on the Process of Tort Reform, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 13, 22-23
(1988).
3. The "Common Sense Legal Reforms Act" was the ninth tenet of the ten-point
"Contract with America" that was the centerpiece of the Republican Party's triumph in the
1994 congressional elections. The emergence and import of these proposals is analyzed in
Carl Tobias, Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REv. 699 (1995).
4. Rhetorically, "common sense" is associated with exemption from carrying any bur-
den of proof. As Clifford Geertz observed, "religion rests its case on revelation, science on
method, ideology on moral passion; but common sense rests its case on the assertion that it
is not a case at all, just life in a nutshell. The world is its authority." Clifford Geertz,
Common Sense as a Cultural System, in LocAL KNOWLEDGE: FURTHER EssAYS IN INTERPRETIVE
ANTHROPOLOGY 75 (1983). The invocation of common sense in tort policy is examined by
Robert Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony, and the Great
American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, 11 STUD. L. POL. & Soc'y 95 (1991).
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And these represent just the tip of the iceberg. Count-
less cases are settled before trial because defendants with
seemingly deep pockets (big companies, professionals, etc.)
are paralyzed by the threat of huge jury awards and/or the
likelihood of paying damages grossly out of proportion to
their share of the blame.
The result is a system out of balance, tilted to favor
plaintiffs and reward their lawyers. The losses to society in
the form of higher product and insurance costs, less innova-
tion, fewer jobs and reduced availability of services are
enormous.
Tort reform is a front-door effort to bring down the cost of
doing business, making American companies globally com-
petitive and freeing citizens from the excessive costs of our
current civil justice system.5
Commenting on the performance of the criminal justice system
in the Simpson trial, a prominent Washington lawyer and former
United States assistant attorney general observed:
The civil justice system seems equally demented, with freak-
ish punitive damage bonanzas for persons who pour coffee
on themselves or ricochet golf balls into their own foreheads.
Immense class-action settlements benefit mostly lawyers,
while actual victims of misfortune are further victimized by
the system to which they turn for relief.6
Former Vice President Quayle, in his memoirs, weaves together many
of these themes in the following story:
We have become a crazily litigious country. Today a
baseball comes crashing through a window, and instead of
picking it up and returning it to the neighbor whose kid
knocked it through-and who pays the glazier's bill in a rea-
sonable, neighborly way-the "victim" hangs on to the base-
ball as evidence and sues the neighbor. (Or the baseball's
manufacturer. Or the glassmaker. Or usually all three.)
Several lawyers are soon billing hours, and the civil docket
has been further crowded by one more pointless case that's
probably going to be part of the 92 percent of cases that get
settled before they come to trial-but not before a huge
amount of time and money has been wasted on everything
from "discovery" to picking a jury that will be discharged
before it ever deliberates this case that shouldn't have gotten
5. CivilJustice: Balance the Scales, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 16, 1995, at A15.
6. Theodore B. Olson, Was Justice Served?, WALL ST. J., Oct. 4, 1995, at A16.
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started in the first place. In America we now sue first and ask
questions later. The system-and the mind set-are ineffi-
cient and anticompetitive. By not paying the huge legal costs
their U.S. counterparts are bearing year after year, foreign
companies have a tremendous advantage. American busi-
nesses and individuals spend more that $80 billion annually
on the direct costs of litigation and higher insurance premi-
ums. Include the extra costs and the figure can top $300
billion.'
In this Article, I shall examine some of the most prominent "com-
mon-sense" assertions offered as evidence of the need for reforms to
reduce access and recoveries. I shall argue that these largely pass by
the real problems of the tort system and offer flawed and harmful
prescriptions for change based on a misreading of the patterns,
trends, and effects of litigation.
In presenting contemporary knowledge about the civil justice sys-
tem, I begin with the observation that obviously there are different
perspectives on the performance of the system and research cannot
resolve all the differences. Even when accurately informed about the
system, observers may differ in their estimations of the priority and
mix of goals that the system should achieve (compensation, deter-
rence, vindication, and so forth). Research cannot erase differences
based on divergent goals, but it can identify the range of policies that
are empirically viable. Not all "views" are deserving of equal respect
and deference. To be credible, a portrayal of the system must take
into account the extant body of reliable empirical data about the civil
justice system. By this I refer to that body of information that has
been systematically collected by institutions (for example, court statis-
tics) or developed by qualified researchers using accepted methods of
data collection, who make their work available for examination.
Presumably, we would not credit a view of the health care system
that depicted hospital admissions as rising when the best evidence
showed that they were falling; nor would we credit a perspective on
educational reform that overlooked what is known about enrollments,
test scores, and demographic trends. Similarly, we should not repose
confidence in any view of the legal system that ignores or misrepre-
sents basic information about its workings.
7. DAN QUAYLE, STANDING FIRM 312 (1994). The origins of the $80 billion and $300
billion figures are examined in Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate About
Civil Justice, 71 DENV. U. L. REv. 77 (1993).
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Unfortunately, much of the debate on the civil justice system re-
lies on anecdotes and atrocity stories' and unverified assertion rather
than analysis of reliable data.9 In part, this is a reflection of the pau-
city of reliable systematic information about the working of the civil
justice system. Members of the research community have urged the
necessity for cultivating a stronger knowledge base.' 0 In a major re-
view of the literature tellingly entitled Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, Michael
Saks concluded that "[m]uch of what we think we know about the
behavior of the tort litigation system is untrue, unknown, or unknow-
able."1' In part this is because:
Data on the litigation system's behavior are meager.
Even the most complete [available] data on federal and state
court activity fall far short of answering the most pressing
and fundamental questions about the performance of the lit-
igation system....
A lack of evidence, which might seem like an insupera-
ble barrier, has barely slowed many policy-makers, scholars,
and other commentators. Their discussions about the behav-
ior of the tort liability system often have proceeded without
even assembling the fragments that do exist, much less paus-
ing to figure out how they fit together. The result is a pic-
ture of the litigation system built of little more than
imagination.' 2
8. The origin and deployment of many of the famous litigation horror stories (the
psychic and the CAT-scan, the ladder in the manure, etc.) are analyzed in Stephen Daniels,
The Question of Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric and
Agenda-Building, 52 LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS. 269 (Autumn 1989); Hayden, supra note 4, at
95; Steven Brill II &James Lyons, The Not-So-Simple Crisis, AM. LAw., May 1986, at 1, 12-17;
Fred Strasser, Tort Tales: Old Stories Never Die, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 39. The continu-
ing flow of such stories is promoted by sources such as "ATRA [American Tort Reform
Association] Horror Stories: Stories That Show A Legal System That's Out of Control,"
which can be found on the internet at http://aaabiz.com/atra/ath.htn.
9. Some of the popular macro-anecdotes about the civil justice system (e.g., the
United States has 70% of the world's lawyers) are analyzed in Galanter, supra note 7, at 77.
10. Marc Galanter et al., How to Improve Civil Justice Policy, 77JUDICATURE 185 (1994);
Deborah R. Hensler, Why We Don't Know More About the Civil Justice System-And What We
Could Do About It, U.S.C. LAw 10 (Fall 1994).
11. Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation
System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1147, 1149 (1992).
12. Id. at 1154-56.
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II. A SHORT TOUR OF ACTUAL TORTS
A. The Dispute Pyramid
In order to understand the system of tort litigation, it is useful to
visualize it, in the standard way that legal studies scholars do, as a "pyr-
amid" made up of successive layers."3 We can imagine a bottom layer
consisting of all the events in which, for example, a particular product
was used or encountered. In a small fraction of these events someone
gets hurt. Let us call this layer injuries. Some of these injuries go un-
perceived; in other instances someone thinks he is injured, even
though he is not. Thus we have a layer of perceived injuries that does
not correspond exactly to injuries because it excludes unperceived in-
juries and includes some mistaken attributions of injury. In many
cases, those who perceive injuries blame themselves or ascribe the in-
jury to fate or chance. But some blame some human agency, a per-
son, a corporation, or the government.14 To dispute analysts, these
are grievances.
15
Among those with grievances, many do nothing further. This
may be for any of the following reasons: they think the injury is de
minimis; they want to get on with their lives; they are wary of the cost
of pursuing claims; or they simply do not know how to pursue the
matter. But some go on to complain, typically to the person or agency
thought to be responsible. This is the level of claims. Some of these
claims are granted in whole or in part: the condition is remedied,
compensation is paid, and the matter is resolved without ever reach-
ing any formal institution. When claims are denied, they are denomi-
13. See generally Felstiner et al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming
Blaming, Claiming .... 15 LAw & Soc'W REv. 631 (1980-81) (providing a conceptual frame-
work for studying the emergence and transformation of disputes); see also Neil Vidmar,
Justice Motives and Other Psychological Factors in the Development and Resolution of Disputes, in
THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: ADAPTING To TIMES OF SCARCITY AND CHANGE
395, 409-13 (Melvin J. Lerner & Sally C. Lemer eds., 1981). The first major empirical
application of this method was undertaken by Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances,
Claims and Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAw & Soc'v REV. 525 (1980-81) (re-
porting on a survey of households estimating the rates of grievances, claims, and disputes
that could have been brought to a civil court of general jurisdiction). For a brief summa-
tion of the pyramid analysis, see Marc Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation and Related Phenom-
ena, in LAw AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151, 183-87 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds.,
1986).
14. Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the United States ofAmerica: Blam-
ing and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. & Soc'v 400 (1991).
15. Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors in Compensation
Seeking in Canada and the United States, 25 LAw & Soc'v REv. 499, 501-02 (1991) [hereinafter
Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injuy]; Herbert M. Kritzer et al., To Confront or Not to Confirnt:
Measuring Claiming Rates in Discrimination Grievances, 25 LAw & Soc'v REv. 875, 879-82
(1991) [hereinafter Kritzer et al., To Confront or Not to Confront].
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nated disputes. Some of these are abandoned without further action,
but some disputes are pursued further. In the product liability and
medical malpractice areas, for example, typically this would be accom-
plished by taking the dispute to a lawyer. In analyzing such disputes,
therefore, we call the next layer lawyers.16
Of the disputes that get to lawyers, some are abandoned, some
are resolved, and some end up as filings in court. Let us call this the
filings layer. Most cases that are filed eventually result in settlement.1"
Typically only a small fraction reach the next layer of trials,18 and a
small portion of these go on to become appeals.
There is a distinct dispute pyramid for each type of claim. Figure
1 displays the way that researchers depict the different pyramids in
some common kinds of legal disputes.1
In spite of the evident differences, dispute pyramids share several
important features. First, there is attrition-often very pronounced-
as cases move up the pyramid; only a fraction of the possible cases
runs the whole course to trials and appeals. Second, as matters pro-
ceed up the pyramid, there is selection.2 ° The cases that survive to the
next layer are not entirely representative of the cohort at a given level.
For example, such survivors may involve larger injuries or involve par-
ties that are more knowledgeable, more contentious, or better sup-
plied with resources.
16. Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injury, supra note 15, at 501-02; Kritzer et al., To Con-
front or Not to Confront, supra note 15, at 879-82.
17. The oft-cited figures of 85% or 90% or 95% settlements are misleading: they repre-
sent the portion of civil cases that does not go to trial. But a significantly larger number of
cases may be disposed of by authoritative decisions in ways other than trial. Kritzer, analyz-
ing some 1649 cases in federal and state courts in five localities, found that although 7%
terminated through trial, another 24% terminated through some other form of adjudica-
tion (arbitration, dismissal on the merits) or a ruling on a significant motion that led to
settlement. Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JunlcA-
TURE 161 (1986). On judicial involvement in the settlement process, see Marc Galanter &
Mia Cahill, Most Cases Settle: Judicial Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV.
1339 (1994).
18. For example, in the federal district courts in 1994, 3.5% of all terminated civil cases
(and 4.8% of tort cases) ended "during or after trial." 1994 AnMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT tbl. C-4. This figure includes cases that settled after commence-
ment of trial. Compare the findings of Kritzer, supra note 17, at 163.
19. This figure is based on a similar figure in Miller & Sarat, supra note 13, at 544.
20. See generally George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984). See also Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Casesfor Trial Biased,
14J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985) (proposing a model for the distribution of litigant estimates
of outcomes that differs from Priest and Klein's model and leads to contrary conclusions
about the litigation process); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REv. 319 (1991) (explain-
ing why a good part of the Priest and Klein framework is at odds with the data and present-
ing data on failed pretrial negotiations).
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FIGuRE 1: COMMON DisPuTE PYRAMIDS
(a) The General Pattern
Court Filings
Lawyers
Disputes
Claims
Grievances
Number per
1000 Grievances
50
103
449
718
1000
(b) Three Deviant Patterns
Court Filings
Lawyers
Disputes
Claims
Grievances
Number per 1000 Grievances
Tort Discrimination Post-Divorce
38 8 451
116 29 588
201 216 765
857 294 879
1000 1000 1000
Tort Discrimination Post-Divorce
Source: Adapted from Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and Disputes:
Assessing the Adversary Culture, 17 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 525, 544 (1980-81).
Third, only a fraction of the potential cases arrives at formal legal
institutions like courts. Most cases are resolved at earlier stages of the
process by the parties themselves, sometimes with the help of
lawyers.2 1
Fourth, formal adjudication serves two purposes: courts directly
resolve a significant minority of disputes, including the most complex
and intractable ones; as importantly, they project the standards and
threats that parties and lawyers use in "bargaining in the shadow of
the law."22 It is precisely because courts project such educative and
21. Kritzer, supra note 17, at 161-62.
22. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (describing divorce litigation as bargaining in
the shadow of legal rules); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering
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deterrent messages that parties and lawyers are able to resolve the vast
majority of disputes without burdening the courts. Conversely, the
earlier layers are important for the courts because they keep the case
volume manageable by screening out cases.
Fifth, as they are broadcast to legal professionals and potential
parties, the standards enunciated by the judiciary influence not only
disputes that are brought to the courts, but also matters that never
reach the courts. Beyond this, they influence the behavior of actors
throughout society. For example, judicial decisions about product lia-
bility not only influence settlements and the bringing of cases, but
also they guide the safety practices of manufacturers.23
Although the pronouncements of the courts are uniquely influ-
ential, just what is going on throughout this complex system cannot
be deduced from these pronouncements. There is no way that we can
tell from the decisions in the few cases that reach the top of the system
what is going on in the multitude of cases that never reach its formal
layers, much less in the relations and events that the system regulates.
B. Claiming Behavior
Many critics are convinced that Americans sue "at the drop of a
hat" and that recourse to court is a first rather than a last resort for an
increasing portion of the population. But in fact, rates of claiming,
with the exception of automobile-related injuries, are low.24 In a mas-
sive national survey of claiming behavior, the Institute for Civil Justice
estimated that claims were put forward in only about ten percent of all
accidental injuries. 25 Claims were made in forty-four percent of mo-
tor vehicle injuries, seven percent of work injuries, and three percent
of other injuries. 26 Thus, " [c] laims associated with motor vehicle acci-
dents accounted for almost two-thirds of the total. ' 27 The Harvard
study of medical malpractice in New York similarly estimated that
"eight times as many patients suffered an injury from negligence as
and Indigenous Law, 19J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981) (suggesting that shadow is cast by cost,
risk, and indigenous regulation as well as by formal rules); HERBERT M. KRITZER, LET'S
MAKE A DEAL: UNDERSTANDING THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS IN ORDINARY LITIGATION 30-56
(1991) (describing the nature of the day-to-day negotiation and settlement of cases in
America's civil justice system).
23. GEORGE EADS & PETER REUTER, RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, DESIGNING SAFER
PRODUCTS: CORPORATE RESPONSES TO PRODUCT LIABILITY LAW AND REGULATION vii (1983).
24. DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, COMPENSATION FOR
ACCIDENTAL INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES 20-21 (1991).
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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filed a malpractice claim in New York State. About sixteen times as
many patients suffered an injury from negligence as received compen-
sation from the tort liability system."2" Richard Abel compiled data on
low claiming rates and concluded that the tort system suffers from a
chronic "crisis of underclaiming" that leads to failure to compensate
needy, deserving victims and failure to discourage unreasonable
risks.29
C. Filings
1. Generally.-Many commentators portray the United States as
in the midst of a great explosion of litigation, in which torts are the
very center of the explosion. Although filings have risen in most
American courts in recent decades, it should be noted that per capita
litigation rates were higher at some points in nineteenth and early
twentieth century America-and higher still, from the few studies we
have, in colonial America. ° But litigation is not increasing inexora-
bly. Looking at the country as a whole, filings of tort cases peaked in
the late 1980s and have been relatively flat or trending downward
since. This trend is displayed in Figure 2, compiled by the National
Center for the State Courts from information supplied by all the states
that counted tort filings separately throughout this period.
28. PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND
PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK: THE REPORT OF THE HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE
STUDY TO THE STATE OF NEW YORK 6 (1990). Analyzing data from California in the late
1970s, Patricia Danzon estimated that "[o]verall, at most 1 in 10 negligent injuries resulted
in a claim, and of these only 40 percent received payment. In other words, at most 1 in 25
negligent injuries resulted in compensation through the malpractice system." PATRICIA M.
DANZON, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: THEORY, EVIDENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 24 (1985).
29. Richard Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 443, 447 (1987).
30. See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4,
36-42 (1983) (comparing data on the number of cases brought in the courts with popula-
tion figures to derive a litigation rate for various populations and to see if this rate has
increased over time); MOLLY SELVIN & PATRICIA A. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE:
A HISTORY OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE Los ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT 32 (1984) (calculating that
the population of Los Angeles County was much more litigious in the late nineteenth
century and in the 1920s and 1930s than it is today). The period from the Depression
through the post-World War II recovery, which forms the background against which we see
recent increases, appears to be the historic low tide of litigation in America. The dwin-
dling of litigation in this period is described by many judges and lawyers of the time. See,
e.g., MORRIS GiSNET, A LAWYER TELLS THE TRUTH 49 (1931); Lester G. Seacat, The Problem of
Decreasing Litigation, 8 U. KAN. CITY L. REv. 135 (1940); David W. Peck, The Future of the Trial
Lawyer, 40J. Am. JUDICATURE SOC'Y 38, 38 (1956).
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STATES, 1984-93
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Source: BRIAN J. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR THE STATE COURTS,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT 23 (1995).
Recent increases in tort filings are sometimes perceived as caused
by dramatic increases in filings of product liability and medical mal-
practice cases. But figures from the ten states that collect information
separately on automobile and non-automobile torts indicate that the
total number of non-automobile torts has been relatively flat, while
growth has been concentrated in automobile torts, as shown in Figure
3.31
From 1991 to 1993, for the twenty-seven states from which infor-
mation on tort filings was available, there was a six percent decline in
tort filings in general jurisdiction courts.3 2 Nationally, dispositions of
civil cases in the state courts have exceeded civil filings since 1988.
3
31. BRANJ. OSTROM & NEAL B. KAUDER, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, EXAMIN-
ING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1993: A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT STATIS-
TICS PROJECT 23 (1995).
32. Id. at 22. For the 16 states for which comparable figures were available for contract
filings, there was a 22% decrease in filings from 1991 to 1993. Id. at 26.
33. Id. at 23.
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FIGURE 3: AUTO AND NoN-AUTo TORT FILINGS IN GENERAL
JURISDICTION COURTS IN 10 STATES, 1984-93
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Source: OSTROM & KAUDER, supra fig. 2, at 23.
The great bulk of the growth in state court caseloads has been and
continues to be in criminal cases and in domestic relations cases. 4
2. In Federal Courts.-The pattern of tort litigation in federal
courts is somewhat different. Only a small portion (less than five per-
cent) of all tort filings, but considerably larger portions of product
liability and mass tort claims, are in federal courts. Looking at the
period since 1984 (to facilitate comparison with the state court data
summarized above) we find a number of differences. These are dis-
played in Figure 4 and its accompanying table. First, unlike the state
figures there is an irregular but upward trend in the number of fil-
ings. Second, the pattern in federal courts seems to be more volatile
than that in the states. Third, product liability plays a much larger
and increasing role in federal tort litigation than in state tort litiga-
tion. Product liability filings in federal district courts rose from
twenty-nine percent of all personal injury filings in 1984 to forty-three
percent in 1995. No directly comparable state court figures are avail-
able, but we do have some data that provides a sense of the much
smaller presence of product liability in state courts. A profile of tort
litigation in large counties in 1992 shows that product liability claims
made up 3.4 percent of all the tort cases disposed of in 1992 (when
34. In the state courts, domestic relations filings in general jurisdiction courts in-
creased by 37% from 1988 to 1993. Id. at 29.
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such cases made up over forty percent of tort cases filed in the federal
courts).85
The federal figures permit more disaggregation. If we divide all
the personal injury cases (which, in 1995, form 92% of all tort cases)
into product liability and other, we can see that both the growth and
the volatility of torts in the federal courts are directly attributable to
changes in product liability filings. There were 23,796 non-product-
liability personal injury filings in 1984 and 23,471 in 1995.36 In con-
trast, product liability filings have grown dramatically since they were
first counted separately in the mid-1970s. From 1984 to 1995, the
number of product liability filings increased from 9677 to 17,631. But
as Figure 4 shows, it was subject to considerable fluctuation. Again,
there is a striking contrast with the state courts, which experienced a
surge in automobile torts during much of this period, while the total
of other tort cases (including product liability) remained relatively
steady.3" This is depicted in Figure 3 above.
The source of those fluctuations in product liability filings has
been changing. The great surge of product liability claims in the
1970s and 1980s was driven by asbestos cases. But since 1990, the
number of asbestos filings has been relatively steady and it is non-as-
bestos cases that jumped dramatically from six thousand in 1992 to
twelve thousand in 1993 to sixteen thousand in 1994, dropping to ten
thousand in 1995. This includes cases about every sort of product
apart from asbestos and three other categories (airplane, marine, and
motor vehicle). Earlier research showed that product liability claims
35. The figure for the 75 states courts is from STEVEN K. SMITH ET AL., TORT CASES IN
LARGE COUNTIES tbl. 1 (Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Rep. No. NCJ-153177, Apr.
1995). The federal figure is a rough estimation from the 1992 and 1993 figures given in
the table accompanying Figure 3A above. Both years are used because the federal statisti-
cal year ends June 30 of the named year. The state figures are for the calendar year.
36. Even if we go back to 1978, there is only a modest rise from a total of 19,072 non-
product-liability personal injury filings.
37. Product liability cases have been counted separately by the Administrative Office of
the Courts beginning with the 1974 statistical year. By the mid-1980s, a much-cited 600%
or 758% rise was taken as emblematic of the vaunted "litigation explosion." The percent-
age increase was exaggerated by using data from the first years of the new classification,
when returns were incomplete, as the denominator. The General Accounting Office con-
cluded that coding changes in 1974 and 1975 made 1976 "a more appropriate baseline
year" for examining the growth in product liability filings. Percentage growth "since 1976
is about one-third the growth calculated, using 1974 as the baseline year." U.S. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRODUCT LIABILTY: EXTENT OF "LITIGATION EXPLOSION" IN FEDERAL
COURTS QUESTIONED 27 (1988).
38. Of course, the available data do not exclude the possibility that there were in-
creases in product liability filings corresponding to those in the federal courts-and correl-
ative declines in other non-automobile torts. But those who portray escalation of product
liability claims have put forward no reason to credit this unlikely scenario.
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tend to cluster around a relatively small number of products and a
small number of corporations.3 9 This same clustering seems to be
present in the current surge of product liability filings. A large por-
tion of these cases are breast implant claims being filed in (or trans-
ferred to) federal courts, many in connection with a massive class
action. Because the Administrative Office of the Courts does not
count breast implant cases separately, we do not knowjust how large a
portion this is.
There is reason to regard the reported totals of product liability
cases as inflated. Reviewing the course of product liability filings in
the federal courts, Terence Dunworth observed that the figures pub-
lished by the Administrative Office of the Courts
do not represent an accurate count of product liability suits
commenced by virtue of the fact that suits transferred to an-
other district, reinstated or reopened after initial termina-
tion, or remanded to district court after appeal have more
than one record in the Administrative Office data base, and
the tables in the annual reports contain counts of these
records rather than counts of suits.'
This pattern, confirmed by knowledgeable professionals within the
federal court system, seems to apply to the breast implant litigation,
which has involved the transfer of over twenty thousand cases.41 Many
breast implant cases filed as class action lawsuits in their original dis-
trict are split into numerous multi-plaintiff cases before transfer to the
Northern District of Alabama.42
39. Tracing the lead defendants in all the federal product liability filings from 1974 to
1986, Terence Dunworth found that half were "concentrated among fewer than 80 lead
defendants ... [while] the other half involved more than 19,000 defendants." TERENCE
DUNWORTH, RAND INST. FOR CVL JUSTICE, PRODUCT LIABILITY AND THE BUSINESS SECTOR:
LITIGATION TRENDS IN FEDERAL COURTS 49 (1988). This information was extracted from a
data set that records only the first named party on each side, so the number of companies
actually involved is undercounted. Dunworth estimated that about one-half of one percent
of all manufacturing concerns were lead defendants in product liability cases in 1976, and
that this increased to nine-tenths of a percent in 1986. Based on a sample from one dis-
trict, he surmises that this estimate of involvement might double if there were information
about co-defendants in each case. Id. at 53-54.
40. Id. at 9.
41. As of April 2, 1996, some 21,378 cases from all 94 districts in the federal system had
been sent to Judge Pointer in the Northern District of Alabama, pursuant to In re Silicone
Breast Implants Products Liability Litigation, 793 F. Supp. 1098 (J.P.M.L. 1992). The
figures are at Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, Litigation Statistics by District,
Docket 926.
42. Telephone Interview with Chris Krus, Multidistrict Litigation Clerk, U.S. District
Court, S.D. Texas (Apr. 12, 1996); Telephone Interview with Sherry Anne Fisher, Multidis-
trict Litigation Clerk, U.S. District Court, N.D. of Alabama (Apr. 10, 1996).
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The pattern of federal court filings for most kinds of tort claims
resembles that in the state courts. While there has been no recent
growth in "ordinary" torts, federal courts are the site of a dynamic and
volatile "mass tort" sector-centering on a relatively small number of
products and industries, increasingly pursued through the class action
device.4" Although this sector comprises only one or two percent of
the national total of tort cases, it occupies a major place in profes-
sional discourse about torts and the media image of the civil justice
system, and it animates the salience of torts as a political issue.
D. Are Jury Verdicts Capricious and Erratic?
While critics claim that jury verdicts are irresponsible and capri-
cious, serious students of the jury are virtually unanimous in their
high regard for the jury as a decision-maker. 4 Undoubtedly courts
could improve juror performance in many ways, but researchers con-
cur that jurors on the whole are conscientious, that they collectively
understand and recall the evidence as well as judges, and that they
decide factual issues on the basis of the evidence presented.45 Review-
ing the empirical evidence about jury performance, Richard Lempert
concluded:
Based on what we know today, there is no empirical case for
a complexity exception to the Seventh Amendment. Instead
the evidence indicates that juries can reach rationally defensible ver-
dicts in complex cases, that we cannot assume that judges in complex
cases will perform better than juries, and that there are changes that
can be made to enhance jury performance.46
43. On the distinctive patterns of this mass tort sector, see DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL.,
RAND INST. FOR CIVILJUSTICE, TRENDS IN TORT LITIGATION: THE STORY BEHIND THE STATIS-
TICS 30-34 (1987);John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action,
95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995).
44. For general discussions of jury competence, see VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR,
JUDGING THEJURY (1986); Valerie P. Hans, Juiy Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOL-
OGY AND LAW (Dorothy I. Kagehiro & William S. Laufer eds., 1992); REID HATIE ET AL.,
INSIDE THE JURY (1983); SAUL M. KASsIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY
ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTivES (1988).
45. MICHAELJ. SAKS, SMALL-GROUP DECISION MAKING AND COMPLEX INFORMATION TASKS
(1981); Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Deci-
sionmaking ly CivilJuries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVILJURY SYSTEM 137 (Brookings Insti-
tution, Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) [hereinafter VERDICT]; Richard 0. Lempert, Civil Juries
and Complex Cases: Let's Not Rush toJudgmen 80 MICH. L. REv. 68 (1981); Christy A. Visher,
Juror Decision Making: The Importance of Evidence, 11 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (1987).
46. Richard Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in
VERDICT, supra note 45, at 181, 235.
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In fact, juries decide cases along the same lines as judges. It is
often assumed that juries are more prone than judges to find defend-
ants liable in civil cases. A generation ago, the University of Chicago
Jury Project found that juries held defendants liable in fifty-five per-
cent of personal injury cases.47 Judges reported that they would have
found liability in fifty-four percent of these cases.48 Judges and juries
agreed on liability in seventy-nine percent of the cases, and the dis-
agreements were approximately even-that is, in ten percent of the
cases the judges would have found liability where juries did not and in
eleven percent of the cases the judges would not have found liability
where juries did.49 This rate of agreement compares favorably with
the consistency achieved by other pairs of decision-makers engaged in
complex human judgments. Shari S. Diamond compiled for compari-
son a set of representative studies of consistency among decision-mak-
ers faced with complex clinical judgments in individual cases, where it
was necessary to "evaluate and combine incomplete or potentially un-
reliable information to reach a decision."5" Table 251 includes the
University of Chicago Jury Project criminal findings, which are compa-
rable to the civil jury findings noted above. As this table shows, the
rate of agreement between juries and judges is in the same range as
agreement between sets of professional decision-makers.
In particular, contemporary jury research tends to discount the
notion that jurors are biased against defendants. While discussing
their intensive study of Delaware jurors' responses to suits against cor-
porations, Valerie Hans and William Lofquist observed:
[T] he tort jurors approached their own cases with considera-
ble suspicion about the plaintiff. Indeed in these personal
injury lawsuits, jurors focused most on the plaintiffs in the
case rather than on the businesses that were sued....
Jurors' dubiousness about plaintiff claims led them to
scrutinize the personal behavior of plaintiffs, trying to under-
stand their motives and to assess the reasonableness of their
claims. Seemingly no aspect of the plaintiffs' behavior was
beyond question. Jurors often penalized plaintiffs who did
47. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REv. 1055, 1065 (1964).
48. Id. Jury verdicts were compared with responses ofjudges who were asked to report
"how he would have decided the case had it been tried to him alone." Id. at 1063.
49. Id. at 1065.
50. Shari S. Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal-Court Decisions, in 2 THE
MASTER LE TURE SERIES: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 119, 124-25 (C. James Scheirer & Bar-
bara L. Hammonds eds., 1983).
51. Id. at 125.
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TABLE 2: FREQUENCY OF CONSISTENCY BETWEEN DECISION-MAKERS ON
COMPLEX DECISIONS
Agreement
between
Decision-makers Stimulus Decision two judges
NSF versus NAS peer 150 grant proposals To fund or not to fund 75%
reviewers submitted to NSF (half funded by NSF)
7 employment 10 job applicants Ranked in top 5 or in 70%
interviewers bottom 5
4 experienced 153 patients interviewed Psychosis, neurosis, 70%
psychiatrists twice, once by each of 2 character disorder
psychiatrists
21-23 practicing 3 patient-actors with Diagnosis: correct, 67%, 77%,
physicians presenting symptoms incorrect 70%
(doctors could request Probability of agreement 55%, 65%,
further information and (both correct or 57%
could order and receive incorrect)
test results)
3,576 judge-jury pairs 3,576 jury trials Guilty or not guilty 78%
12 federal judges 460 presentence reports Custody or no custody 80%
(at sentencing council)
8 federal judges 439 presentence reports Custody or no custody 79%
(at sentencing council)
Source: Shari S. Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal-Court Decisions, in 2 THE
MASTER LECTURE SERIES: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 119, 124-25 (C. James Scheirer & Barbara L.
Hammonds eds., 1983).
not meet high standards of credibility and behavior, includ-
ing those who did not act or appear as injured as they
claimed, those who did not appear deserving due to their
already high standard of living, those with preexisting medi-
cal conditions, and those who did not do enough to help
themselves recover from their injuries.52
In Neil Vidmar's study of medical malpractice juries in North
Carolina, he encountered comparable skepticism toward plaintiffs
and their causes.5" Other studies suggest that the judgments of mal-
practice juries correlate closely with those of physicians. A doctor-led
research group examined 8231 closed malpractice cases in NewJersey
and found that the verdicts rendered by juries in the few cases that
went to trial correlated with the judgment of the insurers' reviewing
52. Valerie P. Hans & William S. Lofquist, Jurors'Judgments of Business Liability in Tort
Cases: Implications for the Litigation Explosion Debate, 26 LAW & Soc'y REv. 85, 94-95 (1992);
See also Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Juy in Business Litigation, 79 JUDICA-
TURE 242 (1996).
53. NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACrICE AND THE AMERICAN JURY 169-70 (1995).
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physicians.54 Countering the notion thatjurors impose liability out of
sympathy, the researchers found that severity of injury did not in-
crease the chances of recovery.55 They concluded that "unjustified
payments are probably uncommon. "56
In a study of 187 Florida medical malpractice cases, Frank A.
Sloan and his associates compared the judgments of a panel of review-
ing physicians with those of juries.
Cases with low defendant liability [as determined by the phy-
sician reviewers] are comparatively likely to be dropped,
those with high defendant liability are more likely to be set-
fled, and a more mixed pattern is apparent for the cases that
are decided at verdict and beyond.
Among the cases decided by a jury verdict or beyond in
which the plaintiff prevailed, defendants were twice as likely
to be "liable" than "not liable." The reverse was true for
claimants who pursued their cases as far and lost. Thus there
is a correspondence between the opinions of the physician
evaluators from our study and outcomes at trial. Liability de-
termination does not appear to be random. Defendants
thought by the evaluators to have been not liable lost at ver-
dict in less than a fifth of the cases.5 7
The erroneous perception of the jury's pro-plaintiff bias is wide-
spread among lawyers.5 8 Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg
found that federal judges decide in favor of plaintiffs in a higher pro-
portion of cases than do juries. 9 They explained this as the result of
lawyers selecting jury trials (or judge trials) because of misattribution
to juries of a pro-plaintiff bias.6"
E. Awards
1. Plaintiffs' Success Rate.-In a new update ofjury verdict trends
in fifteen counties, the Institute for Civil Justice found that the per-
centage of verdicts favoring plaintiffs increased in seven of the fifteen
counties and declined in another seven; the overall plaintiff success
54. Mark I. Taragin et al., The Influence of Standard of Care and Severity of Injury on the
Resolution of Medical Malpractice Claims, 117 ANNALs INTERNAL MED. 780, 782 (1992).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 780.
57. FRANK A. SLOAN ET AL., SUING FOR MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 167-68 (1993).
58. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial byJury orJudge: Tran-
scending Empiricism, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1124, 1127 (1977).
59. Id. at 1175-76.
60. Id. at 1170.
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rate declined from fifty-seven percent to fifty-six percent.61 An analy-
sis by reliable researchers concludes that there probably has been "no
noteworthy trend in plaintiff success rates. "62
2. The Size of Awards. -Not long ago the Jury Verdict Research
Services (JVRS), a widely cited reporting service, reported that award
levels were steady or falling, but the data provided by JVRS are diffi-
cult to interpret.63 The best available research suggests that awards
have been increasing, even when adjusted for general inflation. In
fifteen counties examined in the Institute for Civil Justice's update of
its jury verdict studies, median awards rose from the late 1980s to the
early 1990s in thirteen counties; mean awards also increased in thir-
teen counties in this period.' However, this does not necessarily
mean thatjuries have become unrestrained or more "generous" in the
sense that they are giving larger awards in identical settings. At least
two alternative explanations may account singly or in combination for
the higher observed awards: (1) the composition of the pool of tried
cases has changed; and (2) the cost of compensating victims has
changed.
First, the cases that are tried are a subset of all cases that are filed,
made up of those that are not abandoned, dismissed, or settled.
Changes in filings in general jurisdiction courts (caused by, for exam-
61. ERIK MOLLER, RAND INST. FOR CIVILJUSTICE, TRENDS IN CIILJURY VERDICTS SINCE
1985 tbl. A.5 (1996). Daniels and Martin found mixed patterns in their 19 counties during
the period from 1970-90. They concluded that increases in plaintiff success rates were
associated with changes in the respective states' tort regimes from contributory negligence
to comparative negligence. STEPHEN DANIELS &JOANNE MARTIN, CILJURIES AND THE POLI-
TICS OF REFORM 88-89 (1995).
62. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Litigation Outcomes in State and Federal Courts: A Statistical
Portrait, 19 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 433, 445-47 (1996).
63. JVRS reports that the median compensatory verdict dropped from $66,698 in 1990
to $53,000 in 1994, then rose to $62,000 in 1995; the mean award dropped from $564,549
in 1990 to $451,533 in 1994, then rose slightly to $466,456 in 1995. JURY VERDICT RESEARCH
SERVICES, 1 PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOK, CURRENT AwARD TRENDS IN PERSONAL
INJURY 4 (1996). Because JVRS does not provide information about the number of awards
in its data base, there is no way to tell how thoroughly it represents the entire universe of
awards. For example, the decrease in award levels that it reports may reflect changes in
jury responses to similar cases; or it may reflect changes in the characteristics of the cases
getting to trial; or it may reflect inclusion in the data base of a larger portion of all jury
awards, offsetting the overrepresentation of larger awards suspected by many researchers.
64. MOLLER, supra note 61, at tbl. A.6; see infra tbl. 4. While analyzing jury awards in 19
counties from 1970 to 1990, Stephen Daniels andJoanne Martin found that median awards
were higher in 13 of the 19 counties, 5 of the 13 in California. DANIELS & MARTIN, supra
note 61, at 90. Daniels and Martin suggest that rising medians in California reflected rising
jurisdictional amounts allowed in limited jurisdiction courts and in mandated arbitration.
This development drew off significant numbers of cases, previously handled in courts of
general jurisdiction, from the low end of the awards distribution. Id. at 89-90.
11131996]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
pie, raising the monetary limit of inferior courts or diverting cases
into arbitration) and changes in settlement strategies may affect the
make-up of the cases that get to trial and that, in turn, can affect the
size of awards. In an Institute for Civil Justice study of verdict trends
in Cook County, Illinois, and several California sites in the 1980s,
Mark Peterson observed:
The trends over all cases suggest that the median jury award
is related to the number of jury trials. Usually the median
award moved in the opposite direction from changes in the
number of trials: When the number of trials fell, the median
increased; when the number of trials increased, the median
decreased. This relationship suggests that the total number
ofjury trials changed primarily because the number of small
cases (i.e., those that involved modest damages) increased or
decreased at different times.65
The same phenomenon appears to be operating today. In the re-
cent updating of that study by the Institute for Civil Justice through
1994, the number of jury trials fell in eleven of the fifteen sites-in
many cases substantially. From 1985 to 1994, verdicts in Los Angeles
fell from 459 to 292; in San Francisco from 115 to 57; in Cook County
from 699 to 468.66 As fewer cases are tried, the size of verdicts has
increased.
Second, juries are instructed to award damages that make victims
"whole," but both the wholeness of victims and the means to make
them whole have been changing. For example, if people live longer
or have higher incomes, it will take more money to compensate them
for lost wages. Again, the range of medical and rehabilitative services
has grown dramatically and their costs have outpaced general infla-
tion. In a richer world, as incomes go up and people live longer and
consume more costly medical care, similar injuries may involve larger
losses. A jury seeking to make whole the victim of a given kind of
injury might need to award more dollars to provide a remedy
"equivalent" to that conferred by earlier juries.
Mark Cooper made projections of awards incorporating high and
low assumptions for increases in income levels, life expectancy, and
medical costs, from 1960 to 1994. He then compared actual awards
(reported by JVRS) and found them located in the range defined by
his high and low estimates. He concluded that "the increase in the
65. MARK PETERSON, RAND INST. FOR CnILJUSTICE, CnqLJURIES IN THE 1980s: TRENDS
INJURY TRIALS AND VERDICrS IN CALIFORNIA AND COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS 29-31 (1987) (foot-
note omitted).
66. MOLLER, supra note 61, at tbl. 2.
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dollar value of awards over the past three decades can be attributed to
a combination of inflation, and increases in real income, real medical
costs and life expectancy. "67
The combination of changing case mix and higher costs under-
lies Frank A. Sloan and Chee Ruey Hsieh's finding that in the medical
malpractice verdicts they analyzed,
[o]nce we accounted for general inflation and the other fac-
tors in the regressions, the coefficients of the time variables
generally were not statistically significant at conventional
levels. This result at least partly contradicts assertions about
the "explosive growth in damage awards." Awards have in-
creased, but a large part of the increase reflects changes in
the mix of cases brought to verdict.6"
3. Post-Verdict Attrition.-Jury verdicts are only part of the system
of tort awards, for those verdicts are subject to judicial scrutiny and
modification at post-trial and appellate stages. A line of research es-
tablishes that subsequent judicial action (and settlement in its
shadow) reduces a significant portion of awards, particularly large
awards and punitive damages awards, and that only a portion of the
amount initially awarded is in fact collected from defendants and paid
to plaintiffs. A study of verdicts of $1 million and above returned in
1984 and 1985 found that seventy-four percent of them were reduced
and only forty-three percent of the money originally awarded was paid
to plaintiffs.69 A General Accounting Office study of product liability
cases in five states from 1983 to 1985 found awards reduced in fifty
percent of the cases and found that only seventy-six percent of the
verdict amount was paid.70 A national study of punitive damages
awards in product liability cases from 1965 to 1990 found that no pu-
nitive damages were paid in forty-six percent, part of the award was
paid in fourteen percent, and the full award was paid in only forty
percent. 71 The total collected was roughly fifty percent of the amount
67. MARK COOPER, THE VERDICr IS IN: JURY AWARDS UNCHANGED OVER 30 YEARS: A
RESEARCH REPORT BY CITIZEN ACrION ii (Apr. 1995).
68. Frank A. Sloan & Chee Ruey Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the
Compensation Fair, 24 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 997, 1025 (1990) (foomote omitted).
69. Ivy E. Broder, Characteristics of Million Dollar Awards: Jury Verdicts and Final Disburse-
ments, 11 JusT. Sys. J. 349, 353 (1986).
70. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO/HRD-89-99, PRODUCT LIABILIn:
VERDICTS AND CASE RESOLUTION IN FrVE STATES 45 tbl. 3.5 (1989) [hereinafter U.S. GAO,
PRODUCT LiA.iLIy.]
71. Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anec-
dotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 56 (1992).
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awarded.72 Generally, punitive damages awards are less likely to be
upheld and collected. A study of jury verdicts in Cook County and
some California counties from 1982 to 1984 found that eighty-two per-
cent of awards without punitive damages were collected, but only fifty-
seven percent of awards that included punitive damages were
collected.7"
4. Does the Tort System Overpay Large Claims ?-Among the princi-
pal indictments of the tort system are that the amounts recovered by
successful plaintiffs are excessive; that this is the result of jury capri-
ciousness; that there has been an escalation of such undeserved
awards, facilitated by allowing damage awards for nonpecuniary losses
(often abbreviated into the phrase "pain and suffering"), which are
inherently insusceptible of monetary estimation. The body of re-
search speaks to several of these issues.
The tort system tends to undercompensate large losses and
overcompensate small losses. Studies made over the past forty years
concur that the most seriously injured victims collect a relatively
smaller portion of their losses than do those with less serious injuries.
This research, conducted by scholars, government agencies, and in-
surance industry groups, deals with settled cases as well as the minority
of cases that go to trial. These studies, discussed below, reveal a con-
sistent pattern in compensation payments: victims with smaller inju-
ries tend to receive more than their economic losses while the total
tort recovery of those most seriously injured is less, often much less,
than their economic losses.
o Alfred Conard and his associates studied the reparations paid to
all the victims of automobile accidents that occurred in Michigan in
1958."4 Examining payments from all sources, they found:
When the economic loss was under $1000, the chances were
quite good that it would be paid for with something left over
for psychic loss. But when the [economic] loss was a crush-
ing one-over $10,000 for instance-it was very rare that the
reparation came even close to matching economic loss. Two
72. Id. at 58.
73. MICHAEL G. SANLi & MARK A. PETERSON, RAND INST. FOR CIIL JUSTICE, POST-
TRiAL ADJUSTMENTS TO JURY AwARDs 39 (1987). Eighty-eight percent of awards less than
$100,000 were paid, while only 70% of awards over $1,000,000 were paid. Id. at 34. A study
of punitive damages awards in Cook County from 1979 to 1984 found that 50% of awards
were reduced and only 40% of the total damages were paid. MARK PETERSON ET AL., RAND
INST. FOR CMILJUSTICE, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 27, 29 (1987) [hereinafter
PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES].
74. ALFRED F. CONARD ET AL., AuToMOBILE ACCIDENT COSTS AND PAYMENTS (1964).
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thirds of the persons with such severe losses received less
than a quarter of their economic losses, with no considera-
tion of psychic losses....
When tort recovery was examined separately, the same pattern of un-
derpayment of large losses prevailed: "Most .. . [victims with large
losses] got less than 25 percent of their economic loss, and none
passed 75 percent. The smaller the loss, the higher the percent of
settlement; the larger the loss, the smaller the percent of
settlement." 76
9 A U.S. Department of Transportation survey of compensation
of victims of automobile accidents in 1967 found the same pattern
nationally:
[Moving from] the lowest economic loss class to... the high-
est economic loss class, the ratio of reparations to loss drops
from 1.8 to 0.2. That is, those with small economic losses
recover, on the average, nearly twice their loss, but those
with high economic losses [i.e., $25,000 and over] recover
only one-fifth.77
This calculation includes reparations from all sources, not only
tort. The tort system supplied roughly one third of all the money re-
covered by these victims, but "recovery under tort is relatively less for
large losses than for small losses."78 Those with the smallest economic
losses (less than $499) received 74.4% of their recovery through tort;
those with losses of $25,000 and over received only 17.3% through the
tort system.79
* A 1977 survey conducted by an insurance industry research
group examined 53,164 automobile personal injury claims paid by in-
surers (representing 61.7% of the nationwide auto insurance busi-
ness) .o This survey found:
There was a tendency for persons with small economic losses
to receive more reimbursement per dollar of loss than per-
sons with large economic losses under all types of benefit
sources, government and private. As a group, persons with
economic losses up to $2,500 received payments of more
75. Id. at 179.
76. Id. at 196.
77. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsP., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF AUTOMOBILE ACCIDENT INJU-
RIES 38-39 (1970).
78. Id. at 44.
79. Id. at 44-45.
80. 1 ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY GROUP, AUTOMOBILE INJURIES AND THEIR COM-
PENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1979).
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than $2 for every $1 of economic loss. Those with losses be-
tween $2,501 and $10,000 received more than $1 for each $1
of loss, while those with losses between $10,001 and $25,000
received $.97 and the four persons with losses over $25,000
received $.79 per $1 of economic loss.81
* An insurance industry study of large product liability claims
closed in 1985 revealed the same pattern. Claimants whose economic
loss (including estimated future loss) was under $100,000 received
payments of over five times that economic loss. The small number of
claimants with $1,000,000 or more of economic loss received pay-
ments of only fifty-eight cents for each dollar of economic loss.8 2
The ratio of recovery to economic losses had not increased since
a comparable insurance industry study conducted in 1979. The total
group of 1985 claimants "received $1.36 in tax-free payments for every
$1 of past and estimated future economic loss."8 3 If we assume that
ordinarily these claimants were paying their lawyers about one-third of
the recovered amount, their net return was somewhat less than their
economic losses.
e Institute for Civil Justice researchers studied claims made fol-
lowing all twenty-five major U.S. airline accidents between 1970 and
1984.84 Claims were filed in 99.9% of the 2113 cases for which esti-
mates of loss were available."5 Total recoveries amounted to only one
half (48.6%) of the economic loss to the survivors and one quarter
(25.9%) of the full economic loss.8 6 Recovery rates varied with the
size of the loss: for the bottom 10% of the loss distribution, recovery
rates exceeded 300%; the median recovery rate was 69%; while for the
highest 10% of the loss distribution, the recovery rate was only 19%.7
e Summarizing a number of studies comparing loss replacement
rates for product liability, W. Kip Viscusi concluded that
the common belief that product liability awards lead to wind-
fall gains is erroneous .... The actual value of court awards
and settlements is . often less than the actual losses suf-
fered by the victim.
81. Id. at 17-18.
82. LAWRENCE W. SouLAR, A STUDY OF LARGE PRODUCT LIABILITY CLAIMS CLOSED IN
1985, at 18 (Alliance of American Insurers/American Insurance Association, 1986).
83. Id. at 17.
84. ELIZABETH M. KING & JAMES P. SMITH, RAND INST. FOR CIVL JUSTICE, ECONOMIC
Loss AND COMPENSATION IN AVIATION ACCIDENTS (1988).
85. Id. at 75.
86. Id. at viii, tbl. 5.1.
87. Id. at 67-68.
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The data indicate that insurers tend to overcompensate
small losses because insurers are willing to provide appropri-
ate compensation for pain and suffering and to settle claims,
thereby avoiding administration and litigation costs. How-
ever, insurers tend to undercompensate large losses. 8
Viscusi found that the ratio of payments to losses in product liability
claims decreases in a regular fashion from 7.27 in claims with losses
under $10,000, to 0.67 in claims with losses from $100,000 to
$200,000, to 0.25 in claims with losses over $1,000,000.9 In that small
subset of claims that result in a court award for the plaintiff, the ratios
are even more skewed: those with losses under $10,000 recover 19.39
times their losses; but those with losses of over $1,000,000 recover only
0.05 of their loss-before reductions for attorneys' fees. 90
* Researchers analyzing the relation between medical malpractice
payments and economic loss found that "a 1 percent increase in loss
yields about a 0.1 to 0.2 percent increase in compensation on aver-
age."9" In other words, for every additional dollar of loss, the average
addition to the payment is in the range of ten to twenty cents.
* A study of Florida medical malpractice cases involving birth in-
juries and emergency room treatment found that in both situations
injuries as a whole were undercompensated92 and "the less serious...
injuries ... were better compensated."" The study found:
Overall, cost was appreciably higher than compensation
. ... For claimants who received money, compensation
equalled only 57 percent of total cost....
As in past studies, the least serious injuries were compar-
atively well compensated. Compensation of claimants with
Group I child survivors [with relatively minor impairments]
were paid more than three times the estimated cost. By con-
trast, for Groups II, III and IV [most seriously injured chil-
dren], payment was 37, 80, and 77 percent of cost,
respectively.
94
88. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Govern-
ment Regulation and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 95-97
(1989).
89. Id. at 96 tbl. 5.
90. Id. at 97 tbl. 5.
91. Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 68, at 1019.
92. Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in Medical
Malpractice, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 155 (Winter 1991).
93. Id. at 157.
94. Id. at 155 (footnote omitted).
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The evidence for the persistence and pervasiveness of this pattern
of undercompensation of the most seriously injured is massive.95 As a
distributive mechanism, therefore, tort awards tend to undercompen-
sate large losses and overcompensate small losses. The studies re-
viewed above reveal a consistent pattern in compensation payments:
victims with smaller injuries tend to receive more than their economic
losses while the total tort recovery of those most seriously injured is
less, often much less, than their economic losses.
Many features of the tort system produce this pattern. Princi-
pally, defendants and their insurers have greater incentive to invest in
contesting larger claims; the full costs of major injuries may be more
difficult to assess and settlement may take place before they can be
known with accuracy; policy limits may put a ceiling on large recov-
eries; and decision-makers may be reluctant to apply the principle of
making victims "whole" in cases of catastrophic injury.9" While claim-
ants with small cases can use the threat of imposing transaction costs
to extract "nuisance value,"9 7 defendants in serious claims can use the
uncertainty of recovery to extract from risk-averse claimants steep dis-
counts from the real costs of their injuries."
5. Are Awards for Pain and Suffering Capricious and Arbitrary?-
Contrary to the assertion that awards for so-called noneconomic dam-
ages are capricious and erratic, leading researchers of medical mal-
practice and product liability concur that such awards track the
seriousness of injury.
Reanalyzing data from two malpractice studies, Randall R.
Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan, and James F. Blumstein concluded:
[S]everity directly influences the level of [noneconomic]
damages, as one would expect. In general, more severe inju-
ries result in larger recoveries .... at least within the catego-
ries of physical injury....
95. Similar gradients were found in studies in Ontario in 1965 and British Columbia in
1968. These are analyzed in ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, REPORT ON MOTOR VEHI-
CLE ACCIDENT COMPENSATION 50 (1973).
96. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ROSENTHAL, LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE? 78-79
(Russell Sage Foundation, 1974); KING & SMITH, supra note 84, at 100-03.
97. See STEPHEN CARROLL ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVILJuSTICE, THE COSTS OF ExcEss
MEDICAL CLAIMS FOR AUTOMOBILE PERSONAL INJURIES (1995) (suggesting the prevalence of
false and exaggerated claims among small routine matters).
98. H. AURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENTS 183-93 (1970).
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... [T] he current system works rationally and fairly in
an aggregate sense. "Vertical" equity, the fairness between
separate categories of injury, is rather good. The main prob-
lem is the absence of "horizontal" equity-the extent of vari-
ation within a single category.99
Analyzing 6612 closed malpractice claims from Florida and a set
of 1355 jury verdicts from Florida and other jurisdictions, Sloan and
Hsieh found "systematic patterns underlie differences in awards" and
the severity of injury is the dominant factor. 100 Juror performance in
assessing noneconomic damages compares favorably with that of pro-
fessional decision-makers. Neil Vidmar and JeffreyJ. Rice conducted
an experiment that compared the decisions on pain and suffering
awards by "twenty-one experienced lawyer-arbitrators" 10 1 and "eighty-
nine qualified veniremen," 10 2 who were given the task of "determining
the amount of noneconomic damages for past pain and suffering and
for disfigurement."'0 3 The results, they reported, "lend no support to
the widely held view that jurors are more generous than judges or
arbitrators in awarding noneconomic damages. Moreover, the data
do not support the view that the reasoning of laypersons in calculating
the award is substantially different from that of legally trained per-
sons."' O4 Finally, the authors concluded that if their lay respondents
had been sitting in jury panels, their verdicts would have been "less
variable than those of the arbitrators." 1 5
W. Kip Viscusi, analyzing an insurance industry data base contain-
ing 10,784 closed product liability claims, concluded that the evidence
indicates that payments for noneconomic losses are neither capricious
nor random, but that "pain and suffering compensation does vary in a
systematic and predictable fashion."106 As Viscusi explained, "[Plain
and suffering [compensation] is not entirely random, nor is it the
consequence of a standard mark-up of the magnitude of the eco-
nomic loss compensation. The pain and suffering compensation var-
ies by injury class, with the nature of the effects being broadly
99. Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffer-
ing, "83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 921-24 (1989) (footnote omitted).
100. Sloan & Hsieh, supra note 68, at 1025.
101. Neil Vidmar & JeffreyJ. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical
Negligence: A Comparison ofJurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IowA L. REV. 883, 891 (1993).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 892.
104. Id. at 896.
105. Id. at 897.
106. W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or
Capricious Awards?, 8 INT'L REv. L. & ECON. 203, 219 (1988).
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consistent with general perceptions regarding injury severity."10 7 It is
the systematic character of pain and suffering awards that gives caps
on awards their perverse effects. As Viscusi further observed:
If the problem with pain and suffering awards is that of
capricious and completely random outcomes, one would ex-
pect caps to affect the outliers that are distributed propor-
tionally across injury types. The effect of caps is, however,
much more selective, with the greatest effect being on the
injury groups that have been found to involve substantial
pain and suffering amounts.
The three injury groups that will be most affected [by
caps] are para/quadriplegia, brain damage, and cancer....
In contrast, for the great majority of injury categories,
pain and suffering is not substantial in absolute terms and a
cap would be irrelevant....
Imposition of a product liability cap consequently will
have targeted effects.... To establish the basis for such caps
one must make the judgment that it is the very severe injury
outcomes that involve the most excessive awards.1 08
But, as discussed above, 0 ' it is the most severely injured who are,
on the whole, the least adequately compensated. Hence caps not only
frustrate the compensation goal of the system, but they detract from
its equity. "A proposal to cap awards might increase the degree of
inequity in the manner in which pain and suffering awards are set by
capping severe injuries that merit such awards and leaving the low end
of the awards spectrum unaffected." 10
In addition to undermining both the compensation and equity
goals of the system, caps on nonpecuniary losses seriously compromise
the vital system goal of deterrence or prevention.11 Optimum deter-
rence can be achieved only when injurers are required to bear the full
cost of injuries in instances when courts have determined that further
107. Id. at 217.
108. Id. at 216-17 (footnote omitted).
109. See supra part II.E.2.
110. Viscusi, supra note 106, at 217.
111. See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN
LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICV 185 (1994) ("To the extent that prevention is desira-
ble and, more importantly, obtainable, reforms that cap or limit nonpecuniary loss are
counterproductive."). For an assessment of the success of tort law in deterring dangerous
conduct, see Gary Schwartz, Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really
Deter, 42 UCLA L. REv. 377 (1994).
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preventive measures should have been taken.' 12 Noneconomic losses
entail difficult problems of valuation (which are by no means absent
in such exercises as estimation of future earnings or future medical
needs) and there may well be room for improvement in such valua-
tion. But the imposition of a cap removes the possibility of judicial
achievement of optimum deterrence in cases of the most serious
injuries.
6. Do Awards for Pain and Suffering Play an Increasing Role in the
Tort System?-Rather than being a runaway element driving increases
in tort recoveries, damages for nonpecuniary injuries have been grow-
ing more slowly than awards for lost wages and medical expenses.1 13
The portion of tort recoveries attributable to "pain and suffering" has
been falling over the last fifteen years.114 An unambiguous and defi-
nite assertion on this point is possible due to a series of studies con-
ducted by the Insurance Research Council (formerly the All-Industry
Research Advisory Committee), an insurance industry organization
that carries out research on a variety of topics related to insurance
matters. Of special interest here are three reports of studies of com-
pensation paid to persons injured in automobile accidents. 15 The
data in these reports are drawn from files of paid claims closed by
insurance companies in 1977 (AIRAC 1979), 1987 (AIRAC 1989), and
1992 (IRC 1994). The data sets include all, or almost all, states. The
insurance companies included write most of the auto insurance poli-
112. See Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, What Liability Crisis? An Alternative Explana-
tion for Recent Events in Products Liability, 8 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 51 (1991) ("From a deterrence
standpoint, the inclusion of nonpecuniary losses is desirable because it optimizes both care
levels and activity levels."); Bovbjerg et al., supra note 99, at 934 ("[I]t makes theoretical
and practical sense to assess liability for more than economic loss, so that careless behavior
is sufficiently deterred. To consider only economic loss places at particular risk persons
with little or no earnings, such as homemakers, children, and retirees."(footnotes omit-
ted)); Stanley Ingber, Rethinking Intangible Injuries: A Focus on Remedy, 73 CAL. L. REv. 772,
799 (1985) ("Unless the full costs of physical and emotional distress are properly internal-
ized through tort law, the price of the activities that generated such injuries will insuffi-
ciently reflect their actual costs. In effect, victims of the public would subsidize the cost of
high-risk activities, thereby leading to inadequate deterrence.").
113. See infra fig. 5.
114. See infra fig. 5.
115. 1 ALL-INDuSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COMM., AUTOMOBILE INJURIES AND THEIR COM-
PENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1979) [hereinafter AIRAC 1979]; ALL-INDUSTRY RE-
SEARCH ADVISORY COMM., COMPENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES
(1989) [hereinafter AIRAC 1989]; INSURANCE RESEARCH COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIM-
ING BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPACT ON INSURANCE COSTS (1994) [hereinafter IRC 1994].
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cies in the country (70% in the 1992 study, 1 6 60% in the 1987
study,117 and 61.7% in the 1977 study).1 18
One of the major concerns raised by proponents of tort reform is
the payment of damages for pain and suffering, and particularly the
alleged growth in such payments. Some critics assert that part of the
problem is a multiplier effect: each dollar of actual economic loss
(for example, medical bills and lost wages) yields some multiple in
payment of pain and suffering. The AIRAC/IRC data provide good
evidence about the nature of actual payments in auto accident claims,
indicating that the multiplier is closer to one than it is to three (as in
the proverbial "three times specials").119 Furthermore, the multiplier
has been declining over the fifteen-year period covered by the
AIRAC/IRC studies.12 °
AIRAC/IRC uses the term "economic loss" to refer to all docu-
mented dollar-denominated damages related to injuries sustained in
an accident (excluding property damage losses).12 The two primary
elements of economic loss are medical bills and lost earnings; other
potential elements of economic loss (incurred by relatively few claim-
ants) are replacement of essential services, rehabilitation, and funeral
expenses. 122
For each of the studies, AIRAC/IRC reports both the average eco-
nomic loss and the average total bodily injury payment. The payment
includes both compensation for economic loss and compensation for
noneconomic loss (technically "general damages," but popularly re-
ferred to as "pain and suffering"). From the loss and payment figures,
one can compute a ratio of payment to loss. This ratio has steadily
decreased from 2.34 in 1977,123 to 2.11 in 1987,124 and finally to 1.87
116. IRC 1994, supra note 115, at 1.
117. AIRAC 1989, supra note 115, at 1.
118. 1 AIRAC 1979, supra note 115, at 6.
119. H. LAURENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF INSURANCE
CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 108-09 (2d ed. 1980).
120. See infra fig. 5.
121. See, e.g., 1 AIRAC 1979, supra note 115, at 39.
122. Id. at 41 tbl. 5-2. In the 1987 study, excluding death and permanent total disability
claims, medical expenses constituted 69% of total economic losses, lost wages 27%, with
4% left for other expenses. AIRAC 1989, supra note 115, at 34 (figures for bodily injury
states only). The corresponding figures in the 1992 study were 75% medical, 22% wage,
and 3% other. IRC 1994, supra note 115, at 33.
123. 1 AIRAC 1979, supra note 115, at 40, 47.
124. AIRAC 1989, supra note 115, at 31.
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in 1992,125 indicating a steady decline in the compensation for
noneconomic loss.
Figure 5 displays this relationship between economic loss and
pain and suffering in a way that makes very clear the pattern over
time. The figure shows a series of three pie charts; one section of
each pie represents economic loss and the other represents the re-
maining payment for pain and suffering. As Figure 5 clearly depicts,
pain and suffering payments constitute a decreasing share of the bod-
ily injury damages being paid in auto accident injury compensation.
Although the data discussed here are only for automobile injury
claims, I know of no reason to believe that in other parts of the tort
system payments for pain and suffering are increasing relative to eco-
nomic claims.126 Reports on the overall cost of the tort system by a
prominent actuarial consulting firm suggest a pattern of relative de-
cline in pain and suffering awards akin to that found in the AIRAC/
IRC reports discussed above. It was estimated that in 1987 injury vic-
tims taken as a whole received one dollar for "pain and suffering" for
each dollar they received as compensation for economic loss. 12 7 A
report for 1991 showed that recovery for pain and suffering had
dropped to ninety-five cents for each dollar received for economic
loss. 12 8 In its latest report for 1994, the consulting firm estimated that
injury victims were receiving about ninety-two cents for pain and suf-
125. IRC 1994, supra note 115, at 79. One minor problem with these figures is that
those for 1977 include all cases, while those for the other years exclude small numbers of
cases involving death and permanent total disability. The 1987 report showed a national
figure for 1977 omitting death and permanent total disability cases: 2.29. AIRAC 1989,
supra note 115, at 33. This is only slightly below the 2.34 figure in the text above that
includes those cases.
126. Studying damages awarded for conscious pain and suffering prior to death, David
Leebron examined 256 recorded cases (82% in appellate courts). David W. Leebron, Final
Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256 (1989). Leeb-
ron found that the award for pain and suffering averaged about 23% of the total award, id.
at 304, and that there was a trend toward higher awards, which "reflect[ed] more an in-
crease in the number of rare, very high awards in later periods rather than an increase in
the average amount awarded in most cases." Id. at 302. But while awards increased, the
portion attributed to pain and suffering declined: "In the cases after 1940, conscious pain
and suffering averaged a fairly consistent 22% of the total award, whereas for the years
prior to 1940, it averaged 37% of the total award." Id. at 305.
127. ROBERT W. STURGIS, TORT COST TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 15-16
(1989). A comparable reading of the relative magnitude of economic and noneconomic
damages is found in a survey by the Texas State Board of Insurance of closed bodily injury
claims (excluding product liability) above certain dollar thresholds for periods totalling 16
months over the years 1983-86. Economic damages were estimated to make up 47% of all
dollars paid and noneconomic damages 46%. TEXAS STATE BOARD OF INSURANCE, TEXAS
LIABILrIY INSURANCE CLOSED CLAIM SURVEY 28 (Feb. 1987) [hereinafter TEXAS LIABILrrv
INSURANCE SURVEY].
128. ROBERT W. STURGIS: TORT COST TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (1992).
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FIGURE 5: "PAIN AND SUFFERING" AS A SHARE OF TOTAL AwARDs
1977 1987
Econoici Lc aern& -003m LOI
41%4 Sufferinig enu
1992
Source: 1 ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COMM., AUTOMOBILE INJURIES AND THEIR COM-
PENSATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1979); ALL-INDUSTRY RESEARCH ADVISORY COMM., COM-
PENSATION FOR AUTOMOBILE INJURIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1989); INSURANCE RESEARCH
COUNCIL, AUTO INJURIES: CLAIMING BEHAVIOR AND ITS IMPACT ON INSURANCE COSTS (1994).
fering for each dollar received for economic loss.129 The trend ap-
pears to be the same as that shown in the AIRAC/IRC automobile
data.
F Punitive Damages
1. Incidence Overall and Distribution Across Case Types.--One of the
curiosities of the discourse about civil justice is that there is far more
furor about punitive damages in personal injury cases than in business
dealings, although punitive damages are far more frequent in busi-
ness litigation. This is evident from examination of three recent high
quality collections of data about punitive damages:
(a) Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin of the American Bar
Foundation gathered data on all the jury awards in 82 sites covering
more than 100 counties in 16 states for the years 1988-90.1S They
identified punitive damages awards in 4.5% of all verdicts (8.3% of
verdicts for plaintiffs) at those sites for the years 1988-90. But puni-
tive awards are not spread evenly throughout the docket. In an earlier
report on their data set, Daniels and Martin reported that almost half
129. ROBERT W. STURGIS: TORT COST TRENDS: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 8 (1995).
130. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE POLITICS OF REFORM
(1995) [hereinafter DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES].
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(49.4%) of punitive awards were in intentional tort cases; 31.7% were
in business or contract cases; and 18.9% were in personal injury
cases. 31 Because personal injury cases are far more numerous than
intentional tort cases, this means that while a substantial fraction of
intentional tort cases has a punitive award (22.8%), only a tiny frac-
tion of personal injury cases does-1.5%. Business or contract cases
were in the middle, with punitive awards in 9.2% of all reported
verdicts.13 2
(b) Researchers at the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) and the
National Center for State Courts conducted a study of the civil courts
in a sample of the 75 largest American counties for the year 1992 that
provides a useful cross-section of punitive damages activity. 13 Of the
12,026 verdicts in the sample, plaintiffs won a total of 364 punitive
damages awards-5.9% of the cases won by plaintiffs. Punitive dam-
ages were awarded to winning plaintiffs in only 3.4% of non-inten-
tional tort cases, in 12.2% of contract cases and in 18.5% of
intentional tort cases.13 4 Of the total number of punitive awards,
46.4% were in contract, 10.4% in intentional torts, and 41.8% in other
torts (including, but not exclusively, personal injury).' 5
(c) In a recent report, the Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ) reports
on punitive awards for the period 1985-94 at fifteen sites (including
Los Angeles, Cook, Harris (TX), New York and Kings Counties). 3 6
The overall pattern or incidence corresponds to that in the Daniels/
131. STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, EMPIRICAL PATTERNS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGE
CASES: A DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENCE RATES AND AWARDS 11 (American Bar Foundation
Working Paper No. 8705, 1987). The business contract category included "contract cases,
actions based on a violation of a presumed obligation to act in good faith (e.g., business
interference, insurance bad faith, tortious interference with contract) and breach of duty
or professional malpractice not involving personal injury (e.g., breach of fiduciary duty,
legal malpractice, financial malpractice)." Id. at 24 n.5.
132. Id. at 13. Business and contract cases fell between these figures, with punitive dam-
ages awarded in 9.2% of all reported verdicts.
133. CAROLJ. DEFRANCES ET AL., CIVILJURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES (Bu-
reau ofJustice Statistics Special Rep. NCJ-154346, July 1995). The 75 counties had a total
of 12,000 jury verdicts during the year 1992. The researchers took a sample consisting of
45 of the 75 counties, stratified to ensure that counties of various sizes were represented.
They then compiled a data base consisting of all of the jury verdicts in 38 of the counties
and a sample of verdicts (300 verdicts or half the total number of verdicts, whichever was
larger) in the other seven counties. The total data base consisted of 6504jury verdicts. Id.
at 11.
134. Id. at tbl. 6, tbl. 8.
135. As Table 4 shows, among the 152 non-intentional tort verdicts that included a puni-
tive damages award were eight "slander/libel" cases and 30 "other tort" cases. So the por-
tion of punitive damages awards that definitely appears to be in personal injury cases is
31.3%
136. MOLLER, supra note 61.
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Martin and BJS studies.1 37 Punitive damages were awarded in 3.6% of
the verdicts surveyed. For the ten-year period there were punitive
awards in 17% of intentional tort cases, 14% of all business cases, 2%
of product liability verdicts, and 1.4% of other tort cases.138 Of the
total number of punitive awards, 47% were in business cases, 36% in
intentional tort cases, 5% in product liability cases and 12% in other
tort cases.
Cases involving financial rather than physical harm are the single
largest cluster of punitive damages awards. In the BJS study, of the
364 punitive awards in the 45 counties in 1992, more than half were in
contract, property, and professional malpractice (other than medical)
cases.1 39 In the new ICJ study, business cases produced 47% of the
punitive awards over the 1985-94 period. 140  Daniels and Martin
sorted their cases by the type of harm alleged: physical, financial,
property, or emotional. Financial harm is not only involved in the
largest number of punitive awards, but these awards occur at a higher
rate in cases claiming financial harm than in cases involving other
types of harm.14 1
2. Variation from Place to Place.-The incidence of punitive dam-
ages awards varies from one jurisdiction to another. Daniels and Mar-
tin found that from 1988-90, punitive damages awards ranged 0% in
11 counties (including New York and Kings in New York) to 15.9% of
all verdicts in Travis County, Texas. 142 In the new ICJ study, rates of
punitive awards for the period 1985-94 ranged from 0% in Kings and
Nassau Counties, New York to 6% in Jefferson County, Missouri, and
Orange County, California, and 7% in Harris County, Texas. 143
The inclination to award punitive damages (and to pursue and
uphold them) is an aspect of local legal culture that is little under-
stood. The proclivity of juries" to make punitive awards does not
137. An earlier Institute for Civil Justice study of Cook County and a number of Califor-
nia counties from 1980-84 found punitive awards in about 1% of all personal injury ver-
dicts, 33% of intentional torts, and 11% of "business/contract" cases. PETERSON ET AL.,
PUNrrIwv DAMAGES, supra note 73, at 35.
138. MOLLER, supra note 61, at 35-36 & tbls. A.4, A.5.
139. DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 133, at tbl. 8.
140. MOLLER, supra note 61, at tbl. A.9.
141. DANIELS & MARTIN, CVIL JURIES, supra note 130, at tbl. 6.3.
142. Id. at 214. In an analysis of their earlier data, Daniels and Martin aggregated their
data at the state level and found that the percentage of successful verdicts with punitive
awards was 2.2% in New York, 3.2% in Illinois, 13.1% in Georgia, and 22.0% in Missouri.
143. MOLLER, supra note 61, at tbl. A.9.
144. Punitive damages are commonly associated with jury trials, but judges can also
make such awards. For example, a Califomiajudge awarded $10 million punitive damages
and $1.185 million compensatory damages against two plaintiffs' lawyers for fraud in toxic
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seem to be correlated either with the size of compensatory awards or
the size of punitive awards. The incidence of punitive damages seems
to have little to do with the tendency to find for plaintiffs or to award
generous compensatory damages. Thus when Daniels and Martin did
their initial analysis, Kings County, New York, which had the second
highest plaintiff success rate and the highest median award, had no
punitive damages verdicts whatsoever.
3. Trends in Frequency and Distribution. -These studies differ in
definitions of the categories (e.g., business cases vs. contracts), in the
mix of localities, in the mix of cases proceeding to verdict, and in
research methodology.1 45 It is not possible to juxtapose them to draw
any overall conclusions about trends, but individual studies contain
some suggestive trend data. For example, in the new ICJ study which
compares its fifteen sites for the five years periods 1985-89 and
1990-94, there is a 9% drop in the number of punitive awards from
the earlier to the later period. The number of punitive awards de-
creased in ten locations and increased in five others. 46 Business cases
became even more preponderant. From 1985-89 to 1990-94, the
number of such awards at the 15 sites increased slightly from 230 to
232. (Hence the total number of non-business punitive awards de-
creased by 16% from 282 to 236).147
4. Low Frequency in Personal Injury Cases.-A number of addi-
tional sources confirm the low frequency of punitive awards in per-
sonal injury cases generally and in product liability cases in particular.
An Institute for Civil Justice study of Cook County and a number of
California counties from 1980 to 1984 found punitive damages awards
in about one percent of personal injury verdicts. 14  A study of claims
closed in Texas in the mid-1980s found punitive damages were
awarded in 0.6 percent of claims other than medical and 0.2 percent
of medical professional liability claims.' 49
waste litigation. Marcus & Geyelin, Lawoyers Told to Pay $10 Million Damages, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 20, 1991. I have seen no data on the incidence ofjudge-awarded punitive damages.
145. For example, both Daniels and Martin and ICJ derive their data from jury verdict
reporting services, whereas the BJS study is based on direct examination of court records.
BJS's inclusion of more contract cases and fewer intentional torts may reflect the absence
of the filtering supplied by the jury verdict services.
146. MOLLER, supra note 61, at tbl. A.9.
147. Id.
148. PETERSON ET AL., PuNrrrvE DAMAGES, supra note 73, at 35.
149. TEXAS LIABILrrY INSURANCE SURVEY, supra note 127, at 32. Note that the denomina-
tor here is claims, not verdicts as in the studies discussed above.
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5. Low Frequency in Product Liability Cases.-There is more evi-
dence about the incidence of punitive awards in product liability cases
than in any other type of case.
* A study of Cook and San Francisco Counties from 1960 to
1984, based on jury verdict reporter services in those loca-
tions, found a combined total of only six punitive damages
awards in product liability cases in that quarter century. 150
" A study of the ten "most recent volumes" of each of the
West regional reporters and of all product liability cases in
the United States Courts of Appeals from January 1982 to
November 1984 found punitive damages awards in about
2% of 359 reported product liability cases. 151 (In the ten
cases in which punitive damages were awarded by the trial
court, six were reversed and remanded on appeal; in only
one was the award affirmed in its entirety.)
" An insurance industry study of large product liability cases
closed in 1985 found that punitive damages were paid in
only four of 442 claims, amounting to 0.7% of the total
payments made. 152
" A General Accounting Office study of 305 product liability
verdicts in five states in cases closed in 1983-85 found pu-
nitive damages awards in 23 (7.5% of the total and 16.9%
of the 136 cases won by plaintiffs.) 15 3
" Daniels and Martin found punitive damages awards in
8.6% of product liability verdicts favoring plaintiffs in
1988-90. 154
" In the BJS study of 45 courts in 1992, there were punitive
awards in 2.2% of the product liability verdicts won by
plaintiffs. 5
* In the new ICJ study of fifteen sites, there were punitive
awards in 2.4% of product liability verdicts from 1985-89
and 2.9% from 1990-94.156
Michael Rustad and Thomas Koenig conducted an exhaustive
search for punitive damages awards in product liability cases in both
state and federal courts and discovered that there were far fewer puni-
150. PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES, supra note 73, at 12.
151. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, New Light on Punitive Damages, REGULA-
TION 33, 36 (Sept.-Oct. 1986).
152. SouLAR, supra note 82, at 18-19.
153. U.S. GAO, PRODUCr LIABIuTv, supra note 70. The five states were Arizona, Massa-
chusetts, Missouri, North Dakota, and South Dakota.
154. DANIELS & MARTIN, CVIL JURIES, supra note 130, at 221. In an earlier report on
their data for 1981-85, they had found a rate of 8.9%. Id.
155. DEFRANCES ET AL., supra note 133, at tbl. 8.
156. MOLLER, supra note 61, at tbl. A.5.
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tive awards in product liability cases than is often assumed. They
found a total of 355 punitive damages verdicts from 1965 to 1990.117
Some commentators have sought to discredit this research on the ir-
relevant ground that it was partially funded by the trial lawyers' Ros-
coe Pound Foundation. But no critic has come forward with
information that disconfirms it as a reading of the general magnitude
of the incidence of punitive damages awards in product liability
cases.' 58 The Rustad/Koenig research enables us to identify trends
within the product liability category. Table 3 and the accompanying
Figure 6 taken from Rustad, break down punitive damages awards by
time period and at the same time separate asbestos cases from those
involving all other products.
157. Rustad, supra note 71; see also Hearings on S. 640 Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transp., 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (statements of Michael Rustad & Thomas
Koenig).
158. The studies discussed earlier (Daniels and Martin, BJS, ICJ, Landes and Posner,
etc.) each take a known set of cases and look to see how many involve punitive damages:
The conclusion is a rate of punitive damages verdicts against a background of cases of a
particular type in a particular time, place, and set of courts. The data collection strategy
followed by Rustad and Koenig is quite different: they set out to compile a profile of the
entire universe of personal liability personal injury verdicts in which there is a punitive dam-
ages award from 1965 through 1990 by an extensive search of "Published Appellate Opin-
ions, Computer-Based Searches, Law Review Articles and Legal Commentaries, Court
Records, Trial Verdict Reporters, Interviews with Lawyers, National Verdict Reporters, and
regional and local reporters." Rustad, supra note 71, at 42-44.
This Herculean effort raises two problems: comprehensiveness and representative-
ness. Just how close is it to being the entire population of awards? Undoubtedly there are
some awards that escaped this search procedure, but it seems improbable that many large
or well-publicized awards were missed. As in the earlier studies there is a problem of repre-
sentativeness-that is, can we generalize from features of the set of awards they collect to
the features of the entire population of awards. Because the data set includes every case
that was registered in any one of a large number of media, the cases that are omitted are
ones that failed to register in any of these media. It seems unlikely that such missing cases
would be large or in other ways spectacular. Hence we are probably safe in assuming that
if the sample is biased it is toward over-representation of the most prominent cases and
those involving larger awards.
Despite the admirable thoroughness of these researchers, there is no doubt that they
missed some punitive damages awards. But because their method made it more likely that
cases would be missing in the earlier period than in the later, the reliability of their non-
asbestos trend data is strengthened rather than weakened by the missing data.
1996] 1131
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
TABLE 3: PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS IN PRODUCT LIABILITY
CASES, 1965-90
Years Non-Asbestos Asbestos Total Verdicts
1965-70 7 0 7
1971-75 17 0 17
1976-80 39 2 41
1981-85 119 20 139
1986-90 78 73 151
Totals 260 95 355
Source: Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort
Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REV. 1, 38 (1992).
FIGURE 6: NUMBER OF VERDICTS BY Two-YEAR PERIODS-NON-
ASBESTOS VS. ASBESTOS CASES
60
50
40
30
Z 20
10-
65-66 67-68 69-70 71-72 73-74 75-76 77-78 79-80 81-82 83-84 8586 87-88 88-90
Year of Trial Verdict
-- Non Asbestos N = 260 -0- Asbestos Only N =95
Source: Michael Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anec-
dotes with Empirical Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 38 (1992).
Rustad's figures show an increase in the number of punitive dam-
ages awards, although the rate of increase moderated after a rapid rise
through the mid-1980s. The composition of the population of puni-
tive damages awards changed significantly in the final five year period.
Asbestos and non-asbestos cases display trend lines that are quite dis-
tinctive. Non-asbestos punitive awards fell by one third from the early
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1980s to the late 1980s (from 119 to 78 or 34.5%); while asbestos
awards jumped 265% from 20 to 73. In the early 1980s less than one
sixth of the product liability punitive damage awards were in asbestos
cases; in the 1986-90 period, almost half were asbestos cases.
Subsequent measures by BJS (for 1992) and ICJ (through 1994),
summarized above, provide no reason to suspect any appreciable in-
crease in punitive damages awards in product liability cases.
6. Medical Malpractice. -Daniels and Martin found that 2.5% of
plaintiff victories in medical malpractice cases included a punitive
award (amounting to 0.8% of all medical malpractice verdicts.) 15 9 In
the BJS study, punitive damages were awarded to 3.1% of winning
medical malpractice plaintiffs. Because these plaintiffs won just over
one third of the time (34.7%), punitive awards were present in about
1% of medical malpractice verdicts.16 ° In the recent ICJ study, puni-
tive awards were awarded in 0.6% of medical malpractice cases from
1985-89 and 0.5% from 1990-94.16 t These results comport with the
Texas Insurance Commission study, noted above, that found punitive
awards in medical malpractice cases were only one third as frequent as
in non-medical torts. 162
Rustad and Koenig compiled a data base containing the entire
population of known medical malpractice punitive damages awards
from 1963 to 1993. They found a total of 270 such awards throughout
the United States, which they estimated to be probably less than one
percent of the medical malpractice cases decided during that pe-
riod. 16' Three-quarters of these awards were in the most recent of the
three decades covered in the study."' 4 Rustad and Koenig calculated
that "seventy-one percent of the multi-million dollar punitive damage
awards were assessed against corporate entities."165
7. Award Levels.-An overall profile of award levels is provided
in the BJS "snapshot" study of a sample of the 75 largest counties in
1992. The findings are summarized in Table 4.
159. DANIELS & MARTIN, CIVILJURIES, supra note 130, at 221 (tbl. 6.4).
160. DErFRANcEs ET AL., supra note 133, at tbl. 7,8.
161. MOLLER, supra note 61, at tbl. A.5.
162. TEXAS LIABILITY INSURANCE SURVEY, supra note 127, at 32.
163. Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in Medical
Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters," 47 RuTGERs L. REv. 975,
995, 1006 (1995).
164. Id. at 1004.
165. Id. at 1010.
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Overall, the median award (i.e., the middle one, if all the awards
were ranked from largest to smallest) was $50,000 and the mean (i.e.,
the average) was $735,000. (This is before any post-verdict reduc-
tion.) This indicates that there are relatively few very large verdicts, so
that the average verdict is many times higher than the verdicts in the
great run of cases. If we look at the breakdown by case types, we note
major variation from type to type, but some general patterns as
well.166 In almost every kind of case, the mean award is much higher
than the median, indicating the presence of a minority of very high
awards. There is no evident relationship between the frequency with
which punitive damages are awarded and the amount of damages
awarded. Altogether, almost one quarter of these awards are for more
than $250,000 and about one award in nine is for $1 million or more.
The mean is higher for contract and property cases than for torts, and
there are more high awards in contracts and property.
The new ICJ study of 15 sites portrays a higher level of punitive
awards: overall, it finds a median award of $90,000 for 1990-94 (up
from $56,000 in 1995-89) and a mean of $1,108,000 for 1990-94.167
This mean is up from $626,000 in the earlier period-or down from
$2,698,000-depending on whether the award in the Pennzoil-Texaco
case is excluded or included in the earlier total. This is a vivid demon-
stration of the sensitivity of the mean to the influence of a small
number-here, just one-of very large awards.
Table 5 presents the median and mean awards for all the ICJ sites
and compares award amounts for seven types of cases (product liabil-
ity, medical malpractice, other malpractice, land liability, automobile
personal injury, intentional torts, and business cases) and for the total
of all types of cases, including those not listed separately.
Table 5 shows a rise overall of both median and mean awards, with the
disparity between means and medians little changed.
Analyzing the trends in awards in four large jurisdictions, Daniels
and Martin conclude that
the principal changes in the punitive damage award struc-
ture occurred at the upper end of the award spectrum in all
four sites .... There were, in effect, two punitive damage
systems in these sites. One changed little, except in Los An-
geles, and it is comprised of the bulk of the cases. The sec-
166. Where the number of instances is very small, the figures for specific case types are
not reliable for comparative purposes. For example, note that the mean for the three
punitive awards in product liability cases was only $12,000. This figure is unrepresentative
of what we know about product liability cases from other sources.
167. MOLLER, supra note 61, at tbl. A-6.
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TABLE 5: MEAN AND MEDIAN AMOUNTS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS,
CHANGE OVER TIME AT FIFTEEN SITES
($000)
Fifteen Sites
n. Mean Median
PRODUCT LIABILITY 1985-89 20 1,945 321
1990-94 23 3,000 484
Percentage Change from '85-'89 to '90-'94 +15% +54% +51%
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 1985-89 10 1,214 266
1990-94 9 1,906 365
Percentage Change from '85-'89 to '90-'94 -10% +57% +37%
OTHER MALPRACTICE 1985-89 37 1,126 122
1990-94 55 1,592 189
Percentage Change from '85-'89 to '90-'94 +49% +41% +55%
LAND LIABILITY 1985-89 53 632 98
1990-94 27 651 134
Percentage Change from '85-'89 to '90-94 -49% +3% +37%
AUTO PERSONAL INJURY 1985-89 55 353 24
1990-94 49 493 35
Percentage Change from '85-89 to '90-'94 -11% +40% +46%
INTENTIONAL TORTS 1985-89 181 879 64
1990-94 172 1,067 135
Percentage Change from '85-'89 to '90-'94 -5% +21% +111%
BUSINESS 1985-89 230 884* 61
1990-94 232 2,716 111
Percentage Change from '85289 to '90-'94 +1% +207% +82%
TOTAL** 1985-89 512 626 56
1990-94 466 1,108 90
Percentage Change from '85-'89 to '90-'94 -9% +77% +61%
* $ 14,438,000 if Pennzoil verdict is included.
** Includes categories not presented here.
Source: ERIK MotIFR, RAND INST. FOR CrvILJus-ricE, TRENDs IN CIVILJURY VERDICTS SINCE 1985
tbi. A.6, A.9.
ond involved only the small proportion of cases with the
highest awards, and here the change could be substantial.1 6
When they separate out the highest 25% of punitive damages verdicts,
Daniels and Martin find that the great bulk of these awards are in
financial harm cases. For example, in Dallas in 1986-90, 71.4% of the
highest 25% of awards were in financial harm cases.1 69
One persistent source of concern has been the proportionality
(or lack of it) between compensatory and punitive awards. Table 6
details the relationship between punitive damages and compensatory
168. DANIELS & MARTIN, CVILJURIES, supra note 130, at 231.
169. Id. at tbl. 6.6.
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damages in the 1992 cases in the BJS study. It shows that punitive
damages make up less that half the total award in these cases. In only
40% of the tort cases are punitive damages greater than compensatory
damages; in only 17% are they as much as twice as large as the com-
pensatory damages.
All these findings are about nominal awards, not those actually paid
and collected. As detailed in part II.E.3 above, actual payments of
punitive damages are significantly less than the amounts awarded.
8. The Shadow of Punitive Damages: Their Impact on Settlement.-In
considering the impact of punitive damages, we should recall that full-
blown trials leading to verdicts occur in only a few cases. Most cases
settle. 170 The process of arriving at settlements has been described as
"bargaining in the shadow of the law." Where punitive damages are
part of that shadow, what difference does it make? Anecdotal evi-
dence suggests that the threat of punitive damages can be a significant
factor in settlement. For example, in the litigation arising from the
Buffalo Creek mine dam disaster, the possibility of punitive damages
loomed large in the plaintiff's investigatory strategy and, though not
explicitly mentioned, in the settlement negotiations. 171 Again, in air
crash disasters, the plaintiffs' undertaking not to seek punitive dam-
ages is often the quid pro quo for the defendants' agreement not to
contest liability.172 The threat to defendants is aggravated by the fact
that punitive damages are usually not covered by insurance (in some
places they are legally uninsurable) and may even jeopardize the cov-
erage of the compensatory portion of the award.
The disruptive effect of punitive damages is commonly attributed
to their unpredictability, often reinforced by invoking the imagery of
lotteries, jackpots, and bonanzas. The uncertainty they generate is
thought to exert a chilling effect on useful activity as well as a terror-
izing effect on defendants, inducing them into settlements unrelated
to the merits of the claim. Theodore Eisenberg and his colleagues
recently undertook to test the unpredictability thesis by reanalyzing
the BJS study of 75 large county courts in 1992. They found that the
occurrence of punitive awards was dependent on the type of case,
which presumably was a rough indicator of egregiousness of conduct,
a factor on which the data set provided no direct information. But,
170. See supra note 17.
171. GERALD M. STERN, THE BuFFALo CREEK DISASTER 68, 87, passim (1976).
172. Roy J. Harris, Jr., Insurers Now Settle Faster, More Cheaply, After Big Air Crashes, WALL
ST. J., July 11, 1980, at Al; Andrew Wolfson, Air-Crash Lead Counsel Named: U.S. Judge
Reaches Compromise, NAT'L LJ., July 7, 1986, at 3.
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they observed, "[ i] n the day-to-day practice of law, the parties will have
access to some such information." 1 3 Once a punitive award was
made, they found its size "quite explicable, as legal damages run, from
the size of the compensatory award." ' "[A]fter controlling for other
factors, the level of punitive damages awarded is strongly and signifi-
candy correlated with the level of compensatory damages
awarded""'V-a result in line with an earlier study byJoan Schmit and
her colleagues.1 76 The Eisenberg group concluded that "[f]ar from
picking numbers out of the air, jurors and judges across dozens of
jurisdictions and many case categories determine punitive damages
award levels with a startling consistency." 177
The discernment of such predictability by researchers does not
obviate the sense of unpredictability experienced by lawyers with a rel-
evant population of one. But it does suggest that assertions about un-
predictability are not derived from expert knowledge of aggregate
patterns but are tendentious restatements of the perceptions of
participants.
There is virtually nothing in the research literature about how
these perceptions of punitive damages work out in practice. Some
observers believe the shadow effect of punitive damages is immense
and pernicious. For example, the ex-CEO of Monsanto asserted that
"academic studies and incomplete court data so far have failed to re-
flect the real world of product liability. That real world is buried in
the frequent and huge private settlements driven by the fear of punitive
damages." 78 Unfortunately, the research literature contains almost
nothing on this, but several studies are now underway. Pending their
173. Theodore Eisenberg et al., The Predictability of Punitive Damages 18 (paper pre-
pared for the John M. Olin Conference on Tort Reform, University of Chicago Law
School, June 13-14, 1996) (on file with author).
174. Id. at 15.
175. Id. at 19. The authors confirmed explanation of the relationship between compen-
satory and punitive damages by analysis of two other data sets, the Institute for Civil Jus-
tice's data from Cook County and various California sites from 1960 to 1984. Id. 21-22.
176. Joan T. Schmit et al., Punitive Damages: Punishment or Further Compensation, 55 J.
RISK & INs. 453, 463 (1988) (examining a set of 59 appellate cases involving punitive
awards against corporate defendants from 1978 to 1982 and finding the size of the com-
pensatory award "a consistently and highly significant explanatory variable" and the best
predictor of the size of punitive damages).
177. Eisenberg et al., supra note 173, at 20.
178. RicHARDJ. MAHONEY, PuNrrm DAMAGES-ONCE Is ENOUGH 6 (Washington Univer-
sity, Center for the Study of American Business, Contemporary Issues Series No. 72, May
1995). The author refers to a survey he conducted in early 1995 of large U.S. manufactur-
ing and service corporations to ascertain product liability settlements "driven by punitive
damages" over a five-year period, but does not report the methodology or findings. Id. at
20 n.16.
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arrival, I note a few suggestive studies of closed insurance claims. In
one industry study, claims officials were surveyed concerning two sam-
ples of claims. In a sample of paid claims of all sizes, claimants sought
punitive damages in 3% (109 of 3663) of the claims; none were
granted by the courts, but the respondents reported that in fifteen
(14% of the 109) of those claims there was a "shadow effect" and that
"the total loss would have been an average of 63% lower if the claim-
ants had not sought punitive damages." '79 In another sample of large
claims, punitive damages were sought in 10% (316) of the closed
claims. In four cases, punitive damages were awarded by the courts.
Respondents reported "shadow effects" in 41 claims (13% of the 316),
estimating that "the total loss would have been an average of 55%
lower if claimants had not sought punitive damages." 180 In both stud-
ies the "shadow effect" of the punitive damages across all cases was
estimated at around 1% of the total payout.
The shadow of punitive damages loomed larger in Texas, accord-
ing to a Texas State Board of Insurance study of 5,484 closed bodily
injury claims (excluding product liability) from 1983 to 1986. Puni-
tive damages were requested in 18.5% of all claims analyzed' and
were actually awarded in 0.6% of claims other than medical profes-
sional liability (and in 0.2% of those). 82 The study estimated that
punitive damages played a role in the settlement of 3.3% of the non-
medical malpractice claims and accounted for 5.7% of total loss pay-
ments. It "noted that a significant portion of total punitive damages
reported relates to one large award and settlement."183
III. NEGATIVE EFFECTS ATTRIBUTED TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM
A. Its Excessive Cost
Critics of the civil justice system are convinced that its cost is ex-
cessive. Unfortunately, no one knows just what the costs of the ex-
isting civil justice system are. Former Vice President Dan Quayle gave
wide credence to a report that "the legal system.., now costs Ameri-
cans an estimated $300 billion a year."'8 4 This figure derives from
179. ISO DATA, INC., CLAIM FILE DATA ANALYSIS: TECHNICAL ANALYSIS OF STUDY RESULTS
87 (Dec. 1988).
180. Id. at 86.
181. TEXAS LIABILITY INSURANCE SURVEY, sup'ra note 127, at 30.
182. Id. at 32.
183. Id. at 33.
184. Vice President Dan Quayle, Remarks at the American Business Conference (Oct. 1,
1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, News Archnews, Federal News Service. The same
figure appears in WHITE HOUSE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, FACT SHEET, ACCESS TO
JUSTICE ACT, 1992 (Feb. 4, 1992).
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casual speculation by Peter Huber, who propounded that figure in
1988 as the supposed cost of the tort system. 18 5
A more serious figure is the estimate of the actuarial consulting
firm Tillinghast-Towers Perrin that the cost of the tort system (defined
as the cost of liability insurance and self-insurance) in the United
States in 1994 was $151.5 billion.18 6 Tillinghast estimates that the
United States' tort expenditures are proportionately more than
double those of other advanced industrial countries."8 7 But heavier
reliance on the tort system signifies not only what the United States
has more of, but also what it has less of. Compared to our industrial-
ized counterparts, we do not have an administrative state with inten-
sive governmental regulation of risks, nor do we have a
comprehensive welfare state. As the Tillinghast survey observed,
"America's social welfare system is considerably smaller than that of
any other country studied.""'8 Werner Pfennigstorf and Donald Gif-
ford, comparing compensation systems in ten European countries
with that of the United States, concluded that less frequent resort to
the tort system in other industrialized democracies is partially due to
the presence of public entitlement systems or public and private insur-
ance." 9 These "alternative compensation sources do much of the
work that is accomplished under the tort system in the United
States."190 In short, our greater reliance on tort reflects not greater
generosity to victims, but less reliance on administrative controls and
social insurance.
However, estimates of the costs of the tort system, even those that
are not mere conjecture, have two deeper and more significant
limitations:
e First, these estimates conflate costs and transfers. It is true that,
compared with other compensation systems, the tort system has high
transaction costs.' 91 But a significant portion of the wealth that flows
185. A detailed account of its derivation is presented in Galanter, supra note 7, at 83-87.
186. STURGIS, supra note 127, app. 1.
187. Id. at 16.
188. Id. at 14. For discussions of the scantier coverage and lesser coordination of Ameri-
can social security schemes, see John M. Grana, Disability Allowances for Long-Term Care in
Western Europe and the United States, 36 INT'L Soc. Sci. REV. 207 (1983). See also P.R. KAIM-
CAUDLE, COMPARATIVE SOCIAL POLICY AND SOCIAL SECURITY (1973); cf. ALFRED KAHN, SOCIAL
SERVICES IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 22 tbl. 2.2 (Transaction Books 1980) (1977) (com-
paring income, employment, and social conditions of several countries).
189. WERNER P tNNIGsToRF & DONALD G. GIFFORD, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LIABILITY
LAW AND COMPENSATION SCHEMES IN TEN COUNTRIES AND THE UNITED STATES 160 (1991).
190. Id. at 129.
191. See Marc Galanter, The Transnational Traffic in Legal Remedies, in LEARNING FROM
DISASTER: RJSK MANAGEMENT AFTER BHOPAL 133, 138-39 (SheilaJasanoff ed., 1994) [here-
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through the litigation system is delivered to creditors and wronged
parties who are entitled to compensation under the existing rules.1 92
This half (or more) of the supposed cost is a cost to defendants, but it
is not a cost of the system or a cost to the country, for the wealth is not
lost but only transferred to different hands. That it costs so much to
effectuate these rightful transfers calls for remedy, but controlling
these transaction costs should not be confounded with reducing the
rights of claimants. Indeed, the potential exists to have the worst of
both worlds by reducing the rights of the injured without significantly
reducing the transaction costs of the system.
e Second, critics brandish estimates of costs in isolation from con-
sideration of benefits.' 93 Rather, society's accounts should reflect not
only the costs but the benefits of enforcing such transfers, which af-
ford vindication, induce investments in safety, and deter undesirable
behavior. For instance, the sums transferred by successful patent in-
fringement litigation not only are not lost, but maintain the credibility
of the patent system that in turn has powerful incentive effects. To
put forward estimates of gross costs-even ones that are not make-
believe-as a sufficient guide to policy displays indifference to the vi-
tal functions that the law performs. America's institutions of remedy
and accountability and the judges and lawyers that staff them are
thereby portrayed as burdensome afflictions.
In connection with this second point, the costs attributable to
present institutional arrangements are made to loom menacingly
large by ignoring the costs of alternative arrangements for obtaining
equivalent benefits. For example, if we were to eliminate entirely the
tort system's contribution to accident prevention, presumably people
and businesses would make other expenditures to prevent and mini-
mize injury. The savings from completely abolishing the tort system
would not be all the billions that flow through it-nor even all the
billions spent on it, but only that increment beyond what would be
inafter Galanter, Transnational Traffic]. Among the justifications for using this high cost
compensation system are that it produces preventive effects through deterrence and edu-
cation of potential injurers, it is flexible and adaptive, and it is consonant with notions of
individual responsibility. Id. at 136-39.
192. The Institute for Civil Justice estimated that the net compensation to plaintiffs in
tort cases in 1985 was roughly half of the dollars spent on tort litigation. HENSLER ET AL.,
supra note 43, at 25-26. I know of no data about the ratio of recoveries to total expendi-
tures in nontort litigation.
193. Robert Sturgis, the source of the previously discussed Tillinghast estimates of tort
costs, reminds his audience that "we have settled upon a definition of gross cost without
regard for the social and economic benefits that may be derived from the system." Robert
W. Sturgis, Address to the American Insurance Association (Nov. 14, 1985), cited in NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, Nov. 11, 1985 (on file with author).
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spent on the alternative means of protection." So a genuine assess-
ment of the tort system would have to consider not only its costs, but
both the benefits it produces and the cost of producing such benefits
by alternative means.19 5
B. Effects on the Economy
1. Health Care Costs and Availability.--Critics attribute to the
present civil justice system various deleterious effects on the nation's
economy. One of the more specific charges is that tort liability threat-
ens the cost and availability of health care. Does medical malpractice
liability bear significant responsibility for rising health care costs? The
idea appears to be inherently improbable given that the direct cost of
the whole medical malpractice system represents less than one per-
cent of total national spending on health care. In 1994 medical mal-
practice premiums were 0.65% of total national health
expenditures.1 96 Of course, the presence of medical malpractice lia-
bility may be responsible for expenditures for "defensive medicine."
Studies have divided on the occurrence and extent of defensive
medicine, even in connection with specific procedures.1 97 The Office
of Technology Assessment (OTA) recently analyzed existing studies
and supplemented them with a national survey of cardiologists, sur-
geons, and obstetrician/gynecologists to determine the prevalence of
positive defensive medicine. The OTA defined defensive medicine as
194. See Peter L. Kahn, Pricing the US Legal System, CHRIsTIAN Sci. MONITOR, Sept. 11,
1992, at 19.
195. See Neil K. Komesar, Injuries and Institutions: Tort Reform, Tort Theory, and Beyond, 65
N.Y.U. L. REv. 23 (1990). On the need for cost assessments to take into account the over-
lap of the tort system and administrative regulation, see Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Sim-
ple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1129 (1994).
196. J. ROBERT HUNTER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE: A REPORT OF THE INSURANCE
GROUP OF THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA 1 (Sept. 1995). In 1985 medical mal-
practice cost 0.76% of national health expenditures. Id.
197. For example, one study found cesarean delivery positively associated with physician
malpractice premiums and with physician-perceived risk of suit. A. Russell Localio et al.,
Relationship Between Malpractice Claims and Cesarean Delivery, 269JAMA 366 (1993). Another
study found higher cesarean delivery rates in counties with higher malpractice premiums.
S.M. Rock, Malpractice Premiums and Primay Caesarean Section Rates in New York and Illinois,
103 PUB. HEALTH REP. 459, 459 (1988). Yet another study, however, found no relationship
between cesarean delivery and the "physician's recent medicolegal experience." Gregory
L. Goyert et al., The Physician Factor in Cesarean Birth Rates, 320 NEW ENG. J. MED. 706, 706
(1989). Most recently, a group of researchers found no association between the malprac-
tice experience or exposure of individual physicians and higher use of prenatal resources
or cesarean deliveries for the care of low-risk obstetric patients. Their study "provides no
evidence for the practice of defensive medicine in low-risk obstetrics." Laura-Mae Baldwin
et al., Defensive Medicine and Obstetrics, 274JAMA 1606, 1610 (1995).
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"ordering additional procedures primarily, but not necessarily solely,
out of fear of malpractice liability risk." '98 The OTA concluded:
[I]n the majority of clinical scenarios used in OTA's and
other surveys, respondents did not report substantial levels
of defensive medicine, even though the scenarios were spe-
cifically designed to elicit a defensive response.
Based on the limited evidence available, OTA estimates
that a relatively small proportion of all diagnostic proce-
dures-certainly less than 8 percent overall-is performed
primarily due to conscious concern about malpractice liabil-
ity risk. 199
Were the whole institution of medical malpractice liability elimi-
nated in its entirety, the direct effects on health care costs would be
minimal; the indirect effects, taking into account expenditures on de-
fensive medicine, would be larger, but not massive. We need not as-
sume, however, that no alternative measures for compensation and
deterrence would be substituted for malpractice liability. These sub-
stitutes, whatever they would be, would not be costless, and it is likely
that they would stimulate at least some of the same "defensive" behav-
ior that is found under the current regime.200
It is often claimed that malpractice liability affects not only the
cost of health care, but its availability by driving physicians out of prac-
tice. Concern for the curtailment of the supply of physicians is partic-
ularly focused on the field of obstetrics. Two studies reviewed in the
recent OTA report on defensive medicine, however, fail to confirm
the existence of this linkage.
The first study examined whether New York obstetrician/gynecol-
ogists (OB/GYNs) and family practitioners (FPs) who experienced
high absolute increases in malpractice insurance premiums were
more likely than physicians with lower premium increases to withdraw
from obstetrics practice.2 0 1 The researchers found that "[m]edical
malpractice insurance premium increases were not associated with
physician withdrawal from obstetrics practice for either OB/GYNs or
FPs." 212 The second study looked at whether state premium levels and
personal malpractice claims history accounted for whether OB/GYNs
198. OFFICE oF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRAC-
TICE, 103d Cong. 56 (1994) [hereinafter DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].
199. Id. at 74.
200. The responsiveness of defensive medical practice to tort reform measures is dis-
cussed infra part IV.
201. DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 198, at 69, 71.
202. Id. at 71.
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were practicing obstetrics at all. "The study found that OB/GYNs in
states with greater liability threats and who reported higher personal
malpractice claims exposure were more likely to be practicing obstet-
rics and had higher volumes of obstetric care than their
counterparts."20 '
2. "Economic Well-Being. "--Assertions that the tort system inhibits
the creation of jobs and the economic health of the country are so
commonplace as to pass without notice. But proof of such effects is
not easy to find. It seems inherently improbable that current liability
arrangements represent a substantial economic detriment. For exam-
ple, the cost of product liability in 1993 (measured by insurance pre-
miums) was 13.5 cents per $100 of retail sales-down from 25.9 cents
in 1987.204 A recent survey of U.S. corporations' total liability risk
(not confined to product liability) found that total liability costs were
equal to 0.255% of total revenue, or 25.5 cents for every $100 of reve-
nue. 20  From 1993 to 1994 the overall cost of risk (including workers'
compensation and property risks as well as risk management) fell by
5%, while the cost of liability fell by 22%.2°6
Similar arguments have been made about the effects of the tort
system generally on the economic health of the United States. A body
of studies on this subject makes it possible to assess the case made by
proponents of that larger assertion that the tort system is undermin-
ing the competitiveness of the American economy. So far, serious in-
vestigation has found little evidence of any significant effect on
America's prosperity.
Reviewing the available data on the relation of liability to trade
performance, 0 7 Robert Litan of the Brookings Institution identified
two major lines of argument: (1) liability adds to the cost of doing
203. Id.
204. J. ROBERT HUNTER, PRODUCT LIABILrY INSURANCE EXPERIENCE 1984-1993: A REPORT
OF THE INSURANCE GROUP OF THE CONSUMER FEDERATION OF AMERICA exhibit A, col. N
(Mar. 1995). This figure has to be adjusted to account for self-insurance.
205. TILLINGHAsT-TowERS PERRIN RISK MANAGEMENT PUBLICATIONS & RISK AND INSUR-
ANCE MANAGEMENT SOC'Y, 1995 COST OF RISK SURVEY (1995). The survey included 650 U.S.-
based organizations with an average of approximately $2 billion in revenue.
206. Id. at 2, 4. Total risk cost and its composition fluctuate considerably from year to
year. See id. at 47.
207. Product liability and civil justice do not loom large in the general literature on
competitiveness. In an 831-page opus, Michael Porter devotes less than half a page to
product liability, observing that "a prominent example of an area where regulatory policy
can work for or against national advantage is produc liability. Product liability laws can
benefit competitive advantage by acting like a sophisticated buyer to encourage the devel-
opment of better products." MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS
649 (1990). Porter continues, without providing or citing any supporting evidence:
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business, and (2) "these costs, coupled with uncertainty over out-
comes of tort litigation .. . [deter introduction of] new products or
cost-saving technologies."208
Litan concluded that it is difficult to know the magnitude of the
net cost of liability but estimates "[a] t most. . . that [cost] on average
could be as high as 2 percent of the cost of all products and services
sold in the United States. The effects on individual products could be
much greater. "209 Although "it could affect the composition of U.S.
trade," he reported that "[i] t is highly unlikely that the 'liability tax,'
however large it is, materially or permanently affects the overall U.S.
trade balance. 2
10
Litan himself assembled data on the total "share of revenues
[spent by particular industries] devoted to paying for and avoiding
'risk.' 21 1 These risk costs fluctuate widely from industry to industry
and vary over time. Notably, the overall expenditure on risk costs as a
share of revenues declined from a total of 0.58% of total revenues for
the whole set of industries in 1978 to 0.50% of total revenues in
1984.212
To determine whether differences in risk cost can account for
"any of the crossindustry variation in export performance," Litan
tested the correlation for "the seven industries for which both export
and risk cost data are available" and found no statistically significant
relationship. 2 " Litan observed that "[i] t is not surprising that there is
In the United States, however, product liability is so extreme and uncertain as to
retard innovation. The legal and regulatory climate places firms in constantjeop-
ardy of costly and, as importantly, lengthy product liability suits. The existing ap-
proach goes beyond any reasonable need to protect consumers, as other nations
have demonstrated through more pragmatic approaches.
Id. A 1991 report of the congressional Office of Technology Assessment, analyzing the
competitiveness of American manufacturing, does not even mention product liability. Of-
fice of Technology Assessment, Competing Economies: America, Europe, and the Pacific Rim, 102d
Cong. (1991).
208. Robert E. Litan, The Liability Explosion and American Trade Performance: Myths and
Realities, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2, at 127, 128. Studies of the
impact of liability in five industries are reprinted in THE LIABILTY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF
LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991).
209. Litan, supra note 208, at 128-29.
210. Id. at 128.
211. Id. at 140.
212. Id. at 141 tbl. 3. The data in the table is misreported in the first full sentence of
Litan's article at page 142. Id. at 142.
213. Id. at 143. Litan found:
Among the seven industries . . . there is a small, but statistically insignificant,
positive correlation between the change in exports between 1978 and 1984
(either in absolute dollars or in percentage terms) and the change in the risk cost
as a percentage of sales in these industries during this period. In other words,
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little connection between liability costs and export performance by
industry" because differences in risk costs are "rather minor" and eas-
ily can be swamped by other effects, such as changing energy costs. 14
He also noted that "foreigners may be willing to pay for the added
safety that may be built into U.S.-produced goods as a result of the
deterrence features of our tort system. "215
Litan suggested that the effects on innovation "are potentially
much larger, but much more uncertain than the direct [cost] ef-
fects." 216 An analysis by W. Kip Viscusi and Michael J. Moore found
that product liability actually had a positive net effect on
innovation.217
This effect is not uniform and may reverse once the liability
costs become too great. At low product liability cost levels,
increases in liability costs foster innovation. Extremely high
liability costs depress innovation once the disincentive effect
on new product introductions becomes dominant. For in-
dustries with extremely large liability costs.., the net effect
of product liability is to depress innovation, whereas for the
great majority of firms with lower liability costs, it has a posi-
tive effect.218
Litan examined the relation of research and development ex-
penditures as a percentage of sales (a surrogate for innovation) for all
U.S. industries and for the four industries that were the target of the
largest number of federal product liability suits from 1974 to 1986.
He reported that the results
do not support the alleged innovation-liability link. R&D-to-
sales ratios for all industries increased rather substantially
during the 1980s . .. significantly, that ratio more than
doubled in the drug industry, where product liability suits
have been especially prevalent. Both the industry-wide and
pharmaceutical-specific trends are inconsistent with claims
219that liability fears have dampened innovative activities.
increases in risk costs tend to be associated with an improvement in export perform-
ance, although again this effect is not statistically significant.
Id,
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 129.
217. W. Kip Viscusi & Michael J. Moore, Rationalizing the Relationship Between Product Lia-
bility and Innovation, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2, at 105.
218. Id. at 123.
219. Litan, supra note 208, at 145-46.
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In the absence of supporting evidence, proponents of the view
that the tort system undermines economic well-being rely 'heavily on
surveys of business executives' perceptions of the system's effects.22 °
But assessments of the liability system in the business community are
not uniform. A November 1986 Conference Board survey of risk man-
agers of 232 major U.S. corporations with a minimum annual sales
revenue of $100 million each 22 1-written at the very height of the
great furor about insurance coverage and cost2 2 2 -totally rejected the
notion that there was a major liability crisis. The survey's
most striking finding is that the impact of the liability issue
seems far more related to rhetoric than to reality .... For
the major corporations surveyed, the pressures of product li-
ability have hardly affected larger economic issues, such as
revenues, market share, or employee retention. Liability law-
suits, which are indeed numerous, are overwhelmingly set-
tled out of court, and usually for sums that are considered
modest by corporate standards. As a management function,
product liability remains a part-time responsibility in most of
the responding firms. Where product liability has had a no-
table impact-where it has most significantly affected man-
agement decision making-has been in the quality of the
products themselves. Managers say products have become
safer, manufacturing procedures have been improved, and
labels and use instructions have become more explicit.
The findings of the present survey also refute the gen-
eral contention of a severe and deepening crisis in tort liabil-
ity and insurance availability, at least for the nation's large
220. In a Conference Board survey of the chief executive officers of the 2000 largest
manufacturing companies and a sample of smaller manufacturers, 42% reported that the
product liability system had a major impact on their firms; 47% reported that they had
discontinued product lines; 39% reported that they had decided against introducing new
products; and 49% reported a major impact on international competitiveness. E. PATRICK
McGuIRE, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, THE IMPACT OF PRODUCT LIABILITY v, 6, 8, 20 (Research
Rep. No. 908). Such perceptions are widespread among American business executives. An
early 1992 survey of senior executives found that 62% felt "that the U.S. civil justice system
significantly hampers the ability of U.S. companies to compete with Japanese and Euro-
pean companies." The Verdict from the Corner Office, Bus. WK, Apr. 13, 1992, at 66, 68. Of
course these impressions are themselves not evidence of the existence or magnitude of
these effects. Yet it is entirely possible that this pessimism translates into lower expecta-
tions and less success, which makes even more remarkable the absence of independent
evidence for the alleged depressing effects.
221. NATHAN WEBER, THE CONFERENCE BOARD, PRODUCT LIABILITY. THE CORPORATE RE-
SPONSE v (Rep. No. 893, 1987).
222. Hayden, supra note 4, at 95.
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corporations. The impact on the general economy, likewise,
is believed to have been minor.
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE PREDICTED BENEFICIAL EFFECrs OF REFORM
Just as the present tort system is deemed responsible for many
nasty consequences, claims are made for the beneficial effect of tort
reforms. We are told of various desirable things that have happened
or will presumably happen as a result of the enactment of reforms.
Does the cumulative fund of experience with tort reform give
grounds for confidence that these good things will occur? Almost all
the studies that have attempted to ascertain the effects of tort reforms
have focused on medical malpractice reforms. There is a general con-
currence that the reform with the strongest effect is the imposition of
caps on damage awards. Caps have been found to reduce total pay-
ments to victims,"' in some studies by as much as 23%225 and 39%.226
Caps have been found to reduce underwriting risk and improve
the relative profitability of insurers.227 According to one recent study,
the greatest effect on insurers is to reduce the risk level of the most
unprofitable firms.2 28 Several studies found no evidence of impact on
223. WEBER, supra note 221, at 2.
224. E.g., Stephen Zuckerman et al., Effects of Tort Reforms and other Factors on Medical
Malpractice Insurance Premiums, 27 INQUIRY 167, 180 (1990).
225. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evi-
dence, 49 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 76 (1986).
226. Frank A. Sloan et al., Effects of Tort Reforms on the Value of Closed Medical Malpractice
Claims: A Microanalysis, 14J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 663, 678 (1989). But the effects are
not uniform and sometimes produce surprising results. In a study in Indiana, investigators
were startled to discover that in spite of its comprehensive cap on all damages
between 1977 and 1988, Indiana's mean payment for large malpractice claims was
substantially higher than the mean payments for similar claims in Michigan and
Ohio, independent of sex, age, severity of injury, allegations of negligence, and
year of resolution. Our results are strikingly counterintuitive. We expected Indi-
ana's cap on damages to depress average claim severity, especially since other
Indiana characteristics, for example, fewer physicians and surgeons per capita
and lower urbanization ... should also work to lower claim size ....
It appears that Indiana's cap has actually become a "floor"....
William P. Gronfein & Eleanor D. Kinney, Controlling Large Malpractice Claims: The Unex-
pected Impact of Damage Caps, 16J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 441, 458 (1991).
227. Drucilla Barker, The Effects of Tort Reform on Medical Malpractice Insurance Markets:
An Empirical Analysis, 17J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 143, 158 (1992).
228. W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of Liability
Reform, 24J. LEGAL STUD. 463 (1995).
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premiums,2 2 9 but others found that premiums were reduced2 3 1 or in-
creased less than they otherwise would have been. 31
Other reforms include restrictions on the statute of limitations,
which have been found to reduce the frequency of claims23 2 and col-
lateral source offsets, which have been found to reduce payments.2 3 3
Apart from that, few substantial effects have been found. 4 For exam-
ple, a study of the effects of restrictions on joint and several liability
found weak support for overall reduction of lawsuits. 233 One of the
leading researchers in this area cautioned that because "no one truly
understands what governs trends in claims" we should be modest in
predicting the results of reforms. 3 6
Outside the malpractice area, a study of the effect of punitive
damages caps found that "[t]he size of the typical verdict decreases"
but there is "a much smaller effect on the posttrial amounts collected
by plaintiffs than on the initial award."2 37 The authors of the study
suggest that "much of the impact of tort reform is muted because ex-
isting judicial controls perform the same function by . .. judgment
non obstante veredicto ... motions or remittals.12 38
Virtually all of the malpractice studies confine themselves to a
narrow ambit of effects-payments, premiums, insurance company
losses, and profits-but rarely venture to examine the wider effects of
tort reforms on the injured, on patients and consumers, and on soci-
ety at large. It is often claimed that malpractice reform will encourage
doctors to avoid wasteful expenditures on "defensive medicine," but
the linkage between reform and such effects is far from obvious and
has barely been tested. A recent Office of Technology Assessment re-
port concludes:
229. Id. at 488; Frank A. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance 'Crisis' of the
1970s: An Empirical Assessment, 9J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 629, 642-43 (1985).
230. Zuckerman et al., supra note 224, at 180.
231. Glenn Blackmon & Richard Zeckhauser, State Tort Reform Legislation: Assessing Our
Control of Risks, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST, supra note 2, at 272, 285.
232. Sloan et al., supra note 226, at 665; Danzon, supra note 225, at 71.
233. Danzon, supra note 225, at 72.
234. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, IMPACT OF LEGAL REFORMS ON MEDICAL MAL,
PRACTICE COSTS, 103d Cong. 72 (1993).
235. Han-Duck Lee et al., How Does Joint and Several Tort Reform Affect the Rate of Tort
Filings? Evidence from the State Courts, 61J. RIsK & INS. 295, 311 (1994).
236. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Legislation on Medical Malpractice: Further Developments and a
Preliminary Report Card, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 499, 510 (1989).
237. Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, The Quiet Revolution Revisited: An Empirical Study
of the Impact of State Tort Reform of Punitive Damages in Products Liability, 16(2) JUST. Sys. J. 21,
36 (1993).
238. Id.
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There are reasons to be skeptical that traditional tort re-
forms can reduce defensive medicine. Physicians may not re-
act to mere reductions in malpractice risk. Instead, they may
try to limit their personal risk of suit to as close to zero as
possible. In the absence of any financial penalties for doing
so, such an objective is a rational response to any level of
malpractice risk.
The long-standing concern about defensive medicine
suggests that traditional tort reforms may not do much to
reduce defensive medicine. In the early 1970s, when direct
malpractice costs were quite low and when the malpractice
signals were much weaker than they are today, there was still
considerable concern about defensive medicine.2 3 9
To the extent that tort reform does alter physician behavior,
there may be costs as well as benefits. The OTA report observes:
Tort reforms are predicted to alter physician behavior
because they dull the tort signal and therefore allow physi-
cians to make clinical judgments with less anxiety about the
risk of being sued. Yet, with a reduced malpractice signal,
there could be a reduction in beneficial defensive medicine
as well as defensive medicine that has less clinical value. Soft-
ening the tort signal will also change only those practices
that are consciously motivated by fear of liability.2 40
To assess the impact of malpractice reforms on expenditures for
defensive medicine, Daniel Kessler and Mark McClellan trace the im-
pact of reforms that directly limit liability (caps on damage awards,
abolition of punitive damages, abolition of prejudgment interest, and
reform of collateral source rules) on the rate of growth in expendi-
tures for hospitalization of elderly patients suffering from two heart
ailments.2 4' Comparing reform with non-reform states, Kessler and
McClellan conclude that enactment of reforms led to
substantially lower expenditure growth, somewhat less
growth in the use of intensive procedures (but smaller effects
than would explain the expenditure differences, suggesting
less intensive treatments were also affected), and no conse-
quential effects on mortality.242
239. DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL MALPRACrICE, supra note 198, at 81.
240. Id. at 83.
241. Daniel Kessler & Mark McClellan, Do Doctors Practice Defensive Medicine, 111 Q.J. OF
ECON. 353 (1996).
242. Id. at 385.
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The authors point out that this effect on expenditure growth seems to
fade after a few years so that "long term expenditure growth is not
slower in states that adopt direct reforms. '243 But subsequent growth
"does not appear to offset the expenditure reductions that occur in
the years following adoption."2 " We can anticipate more along this
interesting line of research as the authors (and, one hopes, other in-
vestigators) explore the generalizability of their findings (to non-hos-
pital expenditures, other illnesses, and younger patients) and probe
the robustness of the defensive medicine explanation.
Proponents of tort reform have argued that it would increase the
supply of physicians, particularly in underserved areas. A recent re-
view of malpractice reform observes: "[D]espite anecdotal reports
that favorable state tort environments with strict ... tort and insur-
ance reforms attract and retain physicians, no evidence suggests that
states with strong ... reforms have done so. "245
Indiana is a case in point. Indiana has "the most comprehensive
and severe set of insurance and tort reforms in the nation." 24 But the
"data indicate that Indiana's population continues to have considera-
bly lower per capita access to physicians than the national average.
Moreover, the state has not markedly improved its relative position
since 1975." 247
Fewer studies have attempted to ascertain the effect of tort re-
form on economic performance. The most ambitious is a recent ef-
fort to trace the connection between liability reforms and economic
performance, as measured by productivity and employment.2 48 The
researchers found correlations with increases in productivity and em-
ployment in some industries-although none in manufacturing or
health care-but these might have been an artifact of the passage of
these reforms in higher growth sunbelt states. When researchers
tested to see if the various reforms could explain the observed
243. Id. at 387.
244. Id.
245. Eleanor D. Kinney, Malpractice Reform in the 1990s: Past Disappointments, Future Suc-
cess?, 20J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 99, 120 (1995).
246. Eleanor D. Kinney & William P. Gronfein, Indiana's Malpractice System: No-Fault by
Accident?, 54 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 188 (1991). In a survey of interest groups from
six states, Indiana was the only one in which the respondents thought their malpractice
reforms were effective. Sloan et al., supra note 226, at 683 n.13.
247. Randall R. Bovbjerg, Lessons for Tort Reform from Indiana, 16J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 464, 476-77 (1991).
248. THOMAS J. CAMPBELL ET AL., THE CAUSES AND EFFECTS OF LIABILITY REFORM: SOME
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 4989,
1995).
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changes, the results were inconclusive. 49 The researchers pointed
out that their results were consistent not only with a hypothesis that
liability restrictions improve efficiency, but with several alternative hy-
potheses, 250 including that the reforms merely affected the distribu-
tion of activity rather than its efficiency, and that they actually
promoted an increase in socially harmful activities by diverting re-
sources into activities attended by greater externalities.2 51
In assessing the payment reductions produced by damage caps, it
is important to distinguish between compensation delivered by the sys-
tem and the transaction costs. While confirming that caps succeed in
reducing delivery of compensation, the studies do not examine
whether the cost of delivering that compensation was reduced propor-
tionately. From the point of view of society as a whole, it is the trans-
action costs that are the cost of the system: these are the costs that
consume wealth that society could otherwise expend on some other
desired good. In contrast, the transfer of funds from a tortfeasor to
an injured victim is a cost to the defendant, but not to society as a
whole. So, while we know that a cap is an improvement from the
point of view of the defendant, it does not automatically follow that
there is any improvement from the point of view of society as a whole.
It is possible that the transaction costs of the system have undergone a
relative increase as the compensation delivered by the system has
declined.
Whether or not caps produce the social benefit of lower transac-
tion costs, it is evident that this improvement for defendants comes at
the social cost of aggravating the tort system's problem of vertical eq-
uity. As noted above,252 there is a long-standing pattern of victims
with the most severe injuries receiving compensation that is only a
fraction of their losses.
V. BEYOND THE "TORT REFORM" DEBATE
A. The 'Down by Law" Syndrome
The case for "tort reform" resembles the old joke about the man
who comes to a lawyer's office and tells the lawyer that he will engage
249. Id. at 22.
250. Id. at 28.
251. Id. "[F] irms from states with relatively low levels of liability may have relatively low
costs because they do not bear the true costs of production; this could cause a positive
association between observed productivity, employment and liability reductions even if lia-
bility reductions result in the inefficient deployment of resources into externality-intensive
uses." Id.
252. See supra part II.E.4.
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him if the lawyer assures him that he has clear basis for legal action.
After listening to a lengthy account, the lawyer tells his visitor, "Your
case is absolutely airtight. The other party is dead wrong, and cannot
hope to win the case. I will be happy to represent you for a retainer of
$10,000." Upon hearing this, the client hurriedly gets up to leave.
The attorney protests: "But I told you that your case was good, and
you agreed to hire me if it was a good claim!" "Absolutely not," re-
plied the client, "I'm leaving town. I told you the other guy's side."
Similarly, the evidence for "tort reform"-the facts about filings,
recoveries, jury performance, and economic impact-ends up under-
mining rather than supporting the claims of its proponents. But advo-
cates of tort reform, unlike the client in the joke, do not propose to
leave town. Instead, tort reform is proffered as if it were a precious
and proven elixir that will relieve America's ailments and restore its
flagging fortunes. A cynic might attribute its persistence to the sway
of the powerful interest groups that would benefit from reduced legal
accountability." 3 There is surely an admixture of such self-serving
among its advocates. But from observing this issue for a number of
years, I conclude that what lends urgency and appeal to this issue is
more than the pursuit of interest group advantage. The case for tort
reform is not a case based on calculating analysis of data about the
working of the tort system; its appeal is more elemental and its case is
not analytical but narrative. It is an assemblage of stories that come in
various shapes and sizes-from macro-anecdotes about the United
States having seventy percent of the world's lawyers to tales of belea-
guered little leagues and abandoned day care centers to stories about
absurd and outrageous awards, stories that are often embellishments
where they are not complete fictions. 54 What these stories would
have us believe is that the system has "spun out of control" and
America, or its substantial productive citizens, has been brought
"down by law."
A historian looking back at our time might well find one of the
distinctive and peculiar features of late twentieth century America to
be the consternation about law that gripped much of American soci-
ety in the 1980s and has persisted into the last decade of the century.
America, we hear, has too much law, too many lawyers, too much
spending on legal services, too much litigation, an uncontrolled ac-
tivist judiciary, and an obsessively contentious population that sues at
the drop of a hat. "Everyone knows" that the United States is the most
253. For a listing of prominent players, see T.R. Goldman, Tort Reform: Interests and Agen-
das, LEGAL T MES, Apr. 17, 1995, at S30.
254. For a discussion of these stories, see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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litigious nation on earth, indeed in human history, and that excessive
resort to law marks America's moral decline and portends economic
disaster in an increasingly competitive world. In this "down by law"
view, America's institutions of remedy and accountability, and the law-
yers that staff them, are burdensome afflictions, deadweight losses that
detract from the contributions of the productive. Although the hor-
ror stories and macro-anecdotes that comprise the "down by law" view
have been repeatedly exposed as misleading where not fraudulent,
they have displayed a remarkable resilience in occupying the public
forum and setting the terms of public debate.
But why does the common sense of "down by law" exercise such
dominance? In part this reflects the thin and spotty character of the
knowledge base about the legal system. A fund of basic information
about the working of our legal institutions, of a sort that we take for
granted in discussions of the economy, or health care, or education,
simply does not exist.255 Its absence gives full play to the media's incli-
nation to selective reporting of apparently bizarre claims and exces-
sive awards. Beyond that, the discourse about tort reform reflects a
fundamental imbalance that is intrinsic to tort policy-making.256 Indi-
vidual tort claims involve a battle between victims and injurers about
specific items of past conduct, a battle conducted by specialized cham-
pions within the limiting forms of the judicial contest. But the debate
on tort policy is prospective; the participants are potential injurers
and potential victims. Among the former are large organizations that
can anticipate that they will be repeat players in the civil justice arena
and have the resources as well as the incentive to invest in favorable
rules. Against the tangible stakes of potential injurers, those of poten-
tial victims are remote and diffuse, so they are represented in policy
debate by surrogates who may have cross-cutting interests (like plain-
tiffs' lawyers) or competing priorities (like politicians).
B. The Missing Themes of Remedy and Access
The "down by law" view is often presented as common sense,
shared by all right-thinking Americans. But its relation to widespread
perceptions of the legal system is more complicated: it is a selective,
foreshortened rendition of public perceptions, one that omits some
widespread concerns about civil justice.
255. For discussion of this lack of an adequate knowledge base, see Galanter, supra note
7, at 77; Galanter et al., supra note 10 at 185; Hensler, supra note 10, at 10; Saks, supra note
11, at 1147.
256. KomsAR, supra note 111, at 153-95.
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Much of the wider public shares negative perceptions of lawyers
and litigation. In a recent survey, over half the public thought it a fair
criticism of most lawyers that "[t] hey file too many lawsuits and tie up
the court system."257 Another survey found a resounding seventy-four
percent who agreed that "the amount of litigation in America today is
hampering this country's economic recovery."25
The years since World War II have witnessed a prolonged expan-
sion of the scope and adequacy of legal remedies for many of the ca-
lamities that invade the lives of ordinary Americans. Now, many of the
injured and abused, unlike the predecessors, manage to obtain some
significant remedy for their losses.259 The new accountability imposed
on society's managers and authorities has, however, provoked a fierce
recoil against the civil justice system and a heightened hostility toward
lawyers. The jaundiced view, which sees lawyers as fostering a civil
justice system that is devouring American business and unravelling au-
thority is more intense and more widespread among elites-i.e.,
among those with more wealth, education, and power. Members of
such "top" groups are most likely to think lawyers too numerous, too
influential, and principally responsible for the litigation explosion.26 °
257. PETER D. HART RESEARCH Assocs., A SURVEY OF A-ITITUDES NATIONWIDE TOWARD
LAWYERS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM 16 (1993) [hereinafter HART SURVEY]. Much of the survey
data discussed in this section is derived from three national sample surveys, each con-
ducted by telephone. Two of these surveys were conducted for the National LawJournal,
the first in 1986 and the second in 1993. The third major survey was conducted for the
American Bar Association in 1993.
The first of the National Law Journal surveys was published in David A. Kaplan, The NLJ
Poll Results: Take Heed, Lawyers, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1986, at S-2 (1004 persons surveyed). A
second survey, which largely replicates the 1986 survey and thus provides a useful reading
of recent changes, was conducted by Penn & Schoen Associates, Inc. for the National Law
Journal and the West Publishing Company. The results of this survey were published in
Randall Samborn, Anti-Lawyer Attitude Up, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1 (815 persons
surveyed).
The other 1993 survey was conducted by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., for
the American Bar Association. It was reported in Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public
Perception of Lawyers: ABA Poll A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60 (1202 persons surveyed). More
extensive data can be found in HART SURVEY, supra,
258. Samborn, supra note 257, at 20.
259. See Marc Galanter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L.
REv. 633, 675-76 (1991); Marc Galanter, Bhopals Past and Present: The Changing Legal Re-
sponse to Mass Disaster, 10 WINDSOR Y.B. AccESS TO JUST. 151 (1990).
260. Samborn, supra note 257. The same disparate pattern reappears in the Hart survey,
which found that:
By and large, those who see lawyers in a more favorable light than average tend to
be downscale, women, minorities, and young ....
Americans who are more critical than average tend to be more establishment,
upscale, and male. The higher the family income and socioeconomic status, the
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For all their misgivings about the legal system, most Americans do
not share the sense that it oppresses large businesses. Whenf asked
which types of people were "not apt to be treated fairly by the law,"
respondents to a 1987 Roper survey identified the poor (54%), uned-
ucated (47%), and blacks (33%); only 5% thought "top business exec-
utives" were treated unfairly.261 Indeed, when asked which types of
persons "the courts are too lenient with," government officials and top
business executives ranked, along with heroin users and frequent of-
fenders, just below dope peddlers.2 62
There is an abiding sense that the system favors the rich and pow-
erful. In 1985, when asked whether "It]he justice system in the
United States mainly favors the rich" or "treats all Americans as
equally as possible," fifty-seven percent of respondents chose the "fa-
vored the rich" response and only thirty-nine percent chose the
"equally" response. 63 In a new survey conducted by U.S. News &
World Report, fully seventy-five percent of the respondents thought that
the American legal system affords less access to justice to "average
Americans" than to rich people-and eighty percent of these thought
"much less."" 6
The views of ordinary people cut across the concerns of "tort re-
form" advocates who condemn lawyers for promoting excessive use of
the system. Most people would like to enlarge access to the justice
system rather than restrict it. A recent Yankelovich survey found over-
whelming majorities favor retaining broad rights to sue. Although
thirty-nine percent prefer to retain the present balance between in-
jured and insurers, another thirty-nine percent favor reform that
would "tilt things a little more in favor of those injured in accidents,"
and only seven percent wish to tilt more the other way."'
There are several competing strains of discontent with law and
lawyers: elites stress the widespread resentment of "too much law";
but wider publics are also apprehensive about "not enough justice."
Although "too much law" currently dominates public debate, "not
more critical the adults are. Pluralities of college graduates feel unfavorably to-
ward lawyers, while pluralities of non-college graduates feel favorable.
HART SURVEY, supra note 257, at 4-5.
261. Roper Report No. 87-7 (July 1987) (on file with author).
262. Id.
263. ABC News/Washington Post Survey (June 1985) (USACWP.196.R24) (on file with
author). A decade earlier 59% of a national sample agreed that "the legal system favors
the rich and powerful over everyone else." BARBARA A. CuRRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE
PUBUC: THE FINAL REPORT OF A NATIONAL SURVEy 234 (1977).
264. U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, News Release (Jan. 21, 1995) (on file with author).
265. YANKELOVICH PARTNERS & TALmE-DRAKE RESEARCH & STRATEGY, NATIONAL SURVEY
ON TORT REFORM 3 (Jan. 1995) (Question 5).
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enough justice" is not about to disappear. Attempts to curtail the per-
ceived excesses of litigation will inescapably collide with less vocal but
equally tenacious concerns to enlarge the remedies and protections
afforded by the legal system and to broaden access to them.
C. Some Real World Problems of the Real World Tort System
For now the debate on tort reform overflows with proposals to
solve the "too much law" problem by reducing access and curtailing
remedies; unfortunately it contains very little that reflects wider public
concerns about "not enough justice." Enlarging justice is not just a
matter of leaving the tort system undisturbed. That its most vocal crit-
ics misread the system does not mean that it is performing optimally.
At the outset I mentioned that the "common-sense" attack on the tort
system passed by the real problems of the system. Different observers
have their own lists of these, but in closing I want to point briefly to
several serious structural problems that surfaced in our quick tour of
the system. For simplicity, I label them transaction costs, misalloca-
tion, rationing, and impaired information transmission.
Transaction Costs: Tort is an expensive way of compensating in-
jury victims. Compared to other systems of compensating victims, tort
carries high transaction costs. Because each instance of compensation
involves individualized determinations of liability and damages, it is an
expensive way to move money around.266 A very large portion of the
money extracted from injurers by the tort process is consumed by the
tort process itself. Analyzing data from a number of studies, RAND
researchers estimated that the costs of tort litigation consumed
roughly half of the $29 billion to $36 billion of private expenditure on
that litigation in 1985.267 This relatively expensive system requires ad-
ditional justification to offset its inefficiency as a system for compen-
sating specific classes of injuries. The principal justification is the
generation of preventive effects, a complex process misleadingly con-
266. See Galanter, Transnational Traffic, supra note 191.
267. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 43, at 26. This estimate was for all cases resolved after
filing in courts of general jurisdiction, but did not include claims resolved without filing.
Nor did it include the cost of the governmental institutions, which another team of RAND
researchers estimates as $320 million for 1982. JAMES S. KAKALiK & ABBY E. ROBYN, COSTS
OF THE CrVILJUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR PROCESSING TORT CASES 62 (1982).
The overhead differs from one field of tort liability to another. RAND researchers con-
cluded that, in 1985, costs amounted to 48% of total expenditures on auto tort litigation,
57% of expenditures on tort litigation that did not involve autos, and 63% of expenditures
on asbestos claims. HENSLER ET AL., supra note 43, at 27-28. These studies do not compare
costs at different points in time, but there is some reason to think that there is variation
from time to time as fields become more routine or more problematic.
1158 [VOL. 55:1093
REAL WORLD TORTS
densed into talk of deterrence. Another is its flexibility and adaptive-
ness: the tort system and its personnel are in place and need not be
reformulated and reinstitutionalized for every new task of risk control.
Its open texture and retrospective operation permit rapid adaptation
to new technologies and new encounters. 68
Misallocation: A second and related problem is that as a distribu-
tive mechanism tort tends to have a bias: it tends to undercompensate
large losses and overcompensate small losses. Victims with smaller in-
juries tend to receive more than their economic losses, while the total
tort recovery of those most seriously injured is equal to less, often
much less, than their economic losses.269
Rationing: The institutional capacity of the tort system is grossly
insufficient to do what it promises to do. With the exception of auto-
mobile-related injuries, rates of claiming are low. 27 It has been ob-
served that the tort system can remain afloat so long as only a small
minority of those entitled to invoke it do so. If the constraints of igno-
rance, inhibition, and transaction costs were lowered significantly, the
system would be unable to process all the claims for which it purports
to provide remedies.
Not only are relatively few claims brought, but the system has a
limited capacity to adjudicate those disputes that arise from the claim-
ing process. As more claims are brought to the system and adjudica-
tion becomes more complex and nuanced, the capacity of the system
to provide adjudication has not grown apace. A shrinking portion of
cases is actually resolved by trial or other forms of authoritative dispo-
sition. For example, in federal courts the percentage of civil cases
reaching trial has dropped from 11% in 1961 to 3.5% in 1994.27 t
Impaired Information Transmission: The shrinking of its relative ca-
pacity to provide adjudication makes the system function increasingly
by transmitting signals to parties and potential parties.272 But there
are reasons to suspect that there are significant deficiencies in the
production, transmission, and reception of the knowledge upon
which the system of "bargaining in the shadow of the law" depends.
268. On the "accumulation of unregulated technologies," see Paul Shrivastava, Societal
Contradictions and Industrial Crises, in LEARNING FROM DISASTER, supra note 191, at 259.
269. The studies establishing this pattern are reviewed supra part II.E.4.
270. See supra part II.B.
271. 1994 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT, tbl. C-4.
272. The assumption is that most disputed claims will be disposed of by the parties (and
their lawyers), who will bargain out a resolution "in the shadow of the law," while the
minority of adjudicated cases contribute to the stock of signals and markers that guide
negotiators, as well as potential claimants and defendants, potential victims and injurers.
See supra part II.A.
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Skewed reporting by the media and suppression of information by
confidential settlements and protective orders compound the cogni-
tive biases that attend the use of information in the litigation pro-
cess.273 The efficacy of the tort system depends on a knowledge
system, and we know very little about how well it works.
American tort law manages to be an expensive and inefficient way
to deliver compensation, a risk regulator of uneven and largely un-
known efficacy, an influential register of our moral concerns, and a
remarkable enclave of individualized treatment that has survived in a
world in which the ascendancy of organizations over natural persons is
ever more pronounced.274 It richly deserves a searching examination
of its genuine problems. The current debate on tort reform falls woe-
fully short of being such an examination. A deficient knowledge base
is overwhelmed by the conjunction of interest group campaigns and
"down by law" folklore. We are entrapped in a skewed debate that
addresses the costs (and supposed costs) of tort law with scant consid-
eration of its benefits, of the costs of alternative ways of delivering
those benefits, and of its interaction with the other systems of remedy,
control, and moral education. 275
273. Marc Galanter, The Regulatory Function of the CivilJuy, in VERDICT, supra note 45, at
80-87.
274. James S. Coleman, The Rational Reconstruction of Society: 1992 Presidential Address, 58
AM. Soc. REv. 1 (1993); JAMES S. COLEMAN, POWER AND THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY (1974).
275. Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort Reform,
72 N.C. L. REv. 1129 (1994).
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